The effect of institutional distance on cross-border merger and acquisition time to completion: an empirical analysis of European Union deals by Santos, Célia Maria Ferraz dos
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation  
Master in International Business 
The effect of Institutional Distance on cross-border 
Merger and Acquisition time to completion:                                                                        
An empirical analysis of European Union deals 
 
 
 
 
Célia Maria Ferraz dos Santos 
 
Leiria, June of 2018 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This page was intetionally left blank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation 
Master in International Business 
The effect of Institutional Distance on cross-border 
Merger and Acquisition time to completion:                                                                         
An empirical analysis of European Union deals 
 
 
Célia Maria Ferraz dos Santos 
 
 Dissertation developed under the supervision of Doctor João Neves de Carvalho Santos, professor at the School of Technology and Management of the Polytechnic Institute of Leiria and co-supervision of Doctor Nuno Manuel Rosa dos Reis, professor at the School of Technology and Management of the Polytechnic Institute of Leiria. 
Leiria, June of 2018 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This page was intetionally left blank 
 
 
 
  
iii 
 
 
Dedication  
To my sister, Mila. 
  
iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This page was intetionally left blank 
 
  
v 
 
Acknowledgements  
Firstly, I would like to express my deepest regards to my supervisors, Professor 
Doctor João Santos and Professor Doctor Nuno Reis, for encouraging my research, for the 
support, guidance, comments, suggestions, dedication, recommendations and patience 
through the development of this master dissertation. 
Special thanks go to my previous professors and colleagues with whom I had the 
opportunity to learn and share experiences, which helped me to grow not only as a student, 
but also as a person.  
To my family and friends, my genuine thanks for the support, encouragement and for 
understanding my absences, without which this dissertation would not be a reality.  
Thank you all.   
 
  
vi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This page was intetionally left blank 
 
  
vii 
 
Resumo  
As fusões e aquisições transfronteiriças têm sido usadas como um modo de entrada 
favorito para aceder a mercados estrangeiros, fornecer recursos de uma forma rápida, 
competências e inteligência local, sem enfrentar o risco de legitimidade e sem o custo de 
começar um investimento greenfield. Estudos indiciam que a distância institucional 
aumenta o custo de negociar num pais estrangeiro, já que esta está associada a uma maior 
incerteza e desconhecimento do ambiente local. Para além disso, a duração prolongada de 
um processo de fusão e aquisição tem consequências negativas para as empresas alvo e 
adquirente e trazem custos significativos para ambas. Contudo, até aos dias de hoje, os 
estudos relacionados com o efeito das distâncias institucionais no tempo de conclusão de 
uma fusão e aquisição transfronteiriça são escassos. O modelo proposto especula sobre os 
efeitos das distâncias institucionais (política, económica, administrativa e cultural) no 
tempo de conclusão de fusões e aquisições transfronteiriças. É proposto ainda que a adesão 
à União Europeia, tanto do país alvo, como do país adquirente, modera o efeito das 
distâncias institucionais no tempo de conclusão de uma fusão e aquisição transfronteiriça. 
As hipóteses são testadas através de uma amostra de 2,110 fusões e aquisições 
transfronteiriças que ocorrerem durante o ano de 2011 na União Europeia. Por um lado, os 
resultados sugerem que as distâncias política e cultural têm um efeito positivo no hiato 
temporal entre o anúncio e a conclusão de uma fusão e aquisição transfronteiriça. Por outro 
lado, os resultados indiciam que a adesão à União Europeia modera o efeito das distâncias 
económicas e administrativas no tempo de conclusão de fusões e aquisições 
transfronteiriças. 
Palavras-chave: Fusão e Aquisição transfronteiriça; Teoria Institucional; Tempo de 
conclusão; União Europeia 
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Abstract 
Cross-border merger and acquisitions (CBM&As) have extensively been used as a 
favorite entry mode in foreign markets, rapidly providing resources, competencies and 
local intelligence without risk of facing the liability of foreignness, or the burden of 
starting a greenfield investment. Studies indicate that greater institutional distance 
increases the costs of doing business in a foreign country, because it is associated with 
greater uncertainty and non-familiarity with the local environment. Besides that, prolonged 
duration of the M&A process has negative consequences for target and acquirer firms and 
bear significant costs for both parties. However, until so far, the studies regarding the 
effect of institutional distances on time to completion of a CBM&A deal are scarce. My 
theoretical model speculates on the effect of institutional distances (Political, Economic, 
Administrative and Cultural) in CBM&As time to completion. I further propose that 
European Union membership, of both target and acquirer countries, moderates the effect of 
institutional distances on CBM&As time to completion. The hypotheses are tested using a 
sample of 2,110 CBM&A deals that occurred during 2011 in European Union. On one 
hand, the results suggest that Political and Cultural distance have a positive effect on the 
time hiatus between announcement and completion of a CBM&A deal. On the other hand, 
the results suggest that European Union membership does moderate the effect of Economic 
and Administrative distance in CBM&A time to completion.  
Keywords: Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions; Institutional Theory; Time to 
completion; European Union 
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1. Introduction 
Most of the growth in international production over the past decades has been via 
cross border mergers and acquisitions (CBM&As) (Uddin & Boateng, 2011). In fact, 
CBM&As are one of the most important strategic decisions for a firm to get into different 
geographic locations, whether to access new markets, to grow and gain market power 
(Ramos, 2017), to secure resources, increase global outreach (Kummer, 2007), access 
strategic assets or improve firm’s efficiency (Wu, 2014).  
The number of M&A’s has steadily been on the rise (Faulkner et al., 2012). 
However, over the years, the frequency and value of CBM&As has presented some 
oscillations. If we consider the world, the frequency and volume of M&As have increased 
from a value of 462,253 Million of dollars in 2005 (UNCTAD, 2012) to 525,881 Million 
of dollars in 2011 (UNCTAD, 2012), with a peak in 2008, with 706,543 Million of dollars. 
In European Union (EU) the fluctuation is quite different.  In 2005 we observe a volume of 
sales/purchases of 304,740 Million of dollars. In 2001-2007, the number of EU companies 
acquired by non-EU companies increased and companies in the new member states of the 
EU remained popular targets for EU companies (Campa & Moschieri, 2008). The volume 
of sales/purchases increases to 527,718 Million of dollars, in 2008, but afterwards, we 
observe a significant reduction to 172,257 Million of dollars in 2011 (See table 1A in 
appendix). This situation may have occurred for several reasons: at the end of 2008 the 
financial crisis hit the real economy; In 2009 world GDP fell by 0.6%, happened the first 
world recession since World War II; EU GDP decreased by 4.1% (except Poland); The 
average unemployment rate in the EU rose from 6.1% in 2008, to 10% in 2010 (Santos, 
2016). The financial crisis has become an economic crisis which was reflected in 
CBM&As.  
Researchers in international business have long theorized that firms face inherent 
costs when doing business abroad (liability of foreignness), that arise from the 
unfamiliarity of the environment, from cultural, political, and economic differences 
(Zaheer, 1995). Liability of foreignness may be due to the foreign firm's lower familiarity 
with the market, the lack of information networks, unfamiliarity with, or lack of roots, in 
the local environment, political influence in the host-country, lack of legitimacy of foreign 
firms and the economic nationalism of particular countries, or even the foreign firm's 
inability to appeal to nationalistic buyers (Zaheer, 1995). Whatever the source, the liability 
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of foreignness implies that there are higher costs for a foreign firm operating in a market, 
compared to a local firm (Zaheer, 1995). In fact, for many firms, understanding the 
institutional environment of the target country may be an obstacle to an acquisition 
(Dikova et al., 2010). Thus, the larger (smaller) the institutional distance between the target 
and acquirer countries, the greater (lesser) the level of uncertainty that foreign firms need 
to manage (Dikova et al., 2010). Institutional differences may require managers to engage 
in greater effort to deal with the acquisition (Dikova et al., 2010), by planning and 
organizing the operation from an economic, financial and legal point of view (Caiazza & 
Pozzolo, 2016). The analysis of the institutional environment of the target country may 
generate more time in the acquisition process (Dikova et al., 2010). Since institutional 
distance plays a major role in the completion likelihood of CBM&A deals (Reddy et al., 
2016) it should be taken into consideration during strategic transaction planning by the 
managers (Buczek, 2016). 
Although M&As are a popular mean to conduct business, the strategy does not 
always deliver completing successful deals (Dereeper & Turki, 2013). Though a lot of 
research has been done about the financial, economic and strategic aspects of M&As 
(Otterspeer, 2016), little progress has been made in terms of empirical studies focusing on 
the pre-deal completion phase (Butler & Sauska, 2014; Shimizu et al., 2004). In fact, 
previous studies are limited and focused on specific aspects such as strategy and 
performance (Cai et al., 2015), and they do not provide comprehensive understanding of 
the acquisition completion. There are hardly a few empirical/survey studies that analyze 
abandoned deals or completion likelihood of M&A negotiations (Cai et al., 2015; Dikova 
et al., 2010; Ferreira et al., 2017; Reis, 2017). Besides that, most of the studies pay 
attention to a single dimension of institutional distance (Malhotra et al., 2009; Xu & 
Shenkar, 2002; Zhang et al., 2011). Among the few studies that examine deal duration, the 
focus has largely been on the firm or deal level (Luypaert & De Maeseneire, 2015). For 
example, Dikova et al. (2010) analyzed why firms abandon or fail to materialize the 
previously announced acquisitions, focusing on the institutional environment, noting that 
about 25% of the announced acquisitions are abandoned. However, this study does not 
differentiate the countries of origin of the acquirers, nor of the target firms. In this master 
dissertation I intend to fill this gap by evaluating the effect of institutional distances on 
CBM&As time to completion, in the EU context.  I assume the approach of Dikova et al. 
(2010) as a starting point and extend the context by introducing the moderating effect of 
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EU membership on the effect of institutional distances on deal time to completion. The 
research questions are as follows: 
(1) Does institutional distance, measured as political, economic, administrative and 
cultural distance, influence CBM&As time to completion? 
(2) Does EU membership, from both target and acquirer firms, moderates the effect 
of institutional distances on CBM&As time to completion? 
I argue that firms with higher institutional distances will face difficulties when 
performing a CBM&A deal, increasing the time to completion. The foundation supporting 
my argument is that differences in institutions lead to uncertainty, and firms need to adapt 
and face costs when performing a CBM&A deal (Dikova et al., 2010). Therefore, a 
CBM&A deal between countries with similar institutional environment will probably be 
concluded faster than a deal between countries with higher institutional distances. Besides, 
being part of an open market should diminish the distances, and therefore, reduce the time 
to completion of the deal. 
This study makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, it is different 
from prior studies, that focus only on domestic M&As or in a specific industry (Dikova et 
al., 2010; Ferreira et al., 2017; Reis, 2017). I examine the impact of institutional distances 
on deal time to completion on a wide-ranging number of cross-border deals during 2011. I 
argue that political, economic, administrative and cultural distances will affect the time to 
completion of a CBM&A deal. First, the findings help reinforce previously documented 
evidence that institutional differences influence deal time to completion (Dikova et al., 
2010; Ferreira et al., 2017; Reis, 2017). Second, I make a novel contribution to the existing 
literature on the topic by documenting evidence of the moderating effect of EU 
membership on the relationship between institutional differences and time to completion of 
CBM&A deals. The findings help provide new insights to firms that undertake CBM&As 
in different institutional contexts and broaden the understanding of complicity associated 
with institutions in the strategic location decisions of EU. This study will also aim to 
inform managers of the possible dangers of distance preventing future costs related to the 
duration of the pre-acquisition phase. Besides that, this study points to important clues that 
can be followed by managers and firms that intend to expand across borders into EU. 
This master dissertation is organized as follows. First, on section 2, I review the 
general theory of M&As and their time to completion. Then I exam the Institutional 
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Environment, with an insight on Political, Economic, Administrative and Cultural 
Distances. Later, I analyze the EU. On section 3, I present the conceptual model positing 
institutional distances do have a positive impact on CBM&As time to completion, and the 
effect of those distances is moderated by EU membership, for both target and acquirer 
countries. On section 4, I discuss the sample, the measurement of variables, as well as the 
method that I used to study the hypotheses formulated in the previous section. Results are 
presented on section 5, and discussion is addressed in section 6. I conclude this 
dissertation, in section 7, by referring the limitations of this study, recommending and 
commenting on future research directions. 
2. Literature Review 
This chapter aims at looking at the relevant literature on the subject of CBM&As; 
Time to Completion; Institutional Environment, with focus on the different types of 
distance: political, economic, administrative and cultural; EU; and the relationships 
between these factors. More specifically, this review will focus on how the natures of 
institutional distance impact on CBM&As time to completion, on the context of EU. 
2.1. Mergers and Acquisitions 
M&As are often researched and discussed together (Otterspeer, 2016), but for 
purposes of clarity, it is relevant to distinguish their concept. Acquisitions are referred to 
the purchases of enough shares in an already existing firm, in an amount sufficient enough 
to confer control (Kogut & Singh, 1988). This means that a majority stake of the firm is 
being sold to at least one other firm (Ayar, 2014). Acquisitions are often called as takeover, 
of one firm by another, which means that the buyer takes over the target firm and 
establishes itself as owner (Dutcik, 2017). There are friendly and hostile deals, and the 
word itself is clear on its meaning: in a friendly acquisition, the managers of the target firm 
welcome the acquisition and, on the contrary, in hostile acquisitions the firm’s 
management does not desire to be acquired. In turn, a merger is a combination of firms 
build up, either by the transfer of all assets and liabilities (Buczek, 2016) to one surviving 
firm, or by the joining together of the firms into a single new one (Ayar, 2014), meaning 
that two firms, at least, get combined to form a new one. The merging firms become one, 
jointly owned with a single identity.  
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Furthermore, mergers are categorized in three different types: downstream; upstream 
and sidestream. The first one occurs when a parent firm is absorbed into one of its 
subsidiaries. The upstream merger leaves the parent firm as the surviving legal framework. 
Finally, sidestream mergers describe the merger of two associated companies at the same 
level (Ayar, 2014). Above all, they can be classified in three types: as horizontal, vertical 
and conglomerate. The first type arises between competing firms in the same industry, 
firms join resources in order to achieve synergies and greater power. Vertical ones occur 
between firms with client-supplier relations. They combine efforts to benefit from 
economies of scope. The last one, the conglomerate, can occur between firms without any 
relatedness regarding the industry they operate. They usually happen to diversify risk 
(UNCTAD, 2012). 
Looking at the history of M&As, we can divide them into six major waves: The first 
in the early 1900s, the second in the 1920s, the third in the 1960s, the fourth in the 1980s, 
the fifth in the 1990s, and the last one, the sixth, in the beginning of 2000’s, more precisely 
2003-08 (Dutcik, 2017). However, in Europe, the most significant wave is considered to be 
the fifth. The waves before that were almost unnoticed, but the fifth wave has opened an 
unprecedented demand for M&A transactions in Europe (Dutcik, 2017). The numbers are 
clear: total monetary value of the fifth wave is estimated to be US 5.6 trillion, which is 
more than eight times the value of the 4th wave. The introduction of the common currency 
and an internal market among the EU member states, technological innovation, and 
globalization process are believed to be one of the many reasons for active participation in 
the fifth M&A wave in Europe (Dutcik, 2017). A slow-down along the years has been 
noticed, however, a recovery, especially with focus on cross-border deals is expected in the 
long-run and indications show that the next wave will be driven by investments in 
emerging markets (Ayar, 2014). 
If both firms that are involved in the deal are located in the same nation, they are 
considered domestic; if the transaction involves two companies from two different 
countries they are deemed CBM&A (Pablo, 2009; Shimizu et al., 2004).  
Firms undertake CBM&A deals for several reasons. CBM&As are one of the most 
important strategic decisions for a firm and are arguably one of the most resource-intensive 
forms of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Moschieri et al, 2014; Pablo, 2009) as they 
represent an important and faster alternative for strategic expansion (Shimizu et al., 2004). 
Firms merge when combining them increases the value or utility from the perception of the 
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acquiring firm’s managers (Erel et al., 2012). Several scholars argue that M&As are a 
common and important response to globalization and the changing market environment 
(Lodorfos & Boateng, 2006). CBM&As have been motivated by the necessary search for 
new opportunities across different geographic locations and markets in a turbulent and 
continuously changing environment (Shimizu et al., 2004). Acquiring a foreign existing 
business allows the acquiring firm to obtain expertise, technology, products (Lodorfos & 
Boateng, 2006), gain its resources, such as knowledge base, technology, and human 
resources (Shimizu et al., 2004), reduce exposure to operational and financial risks 
(Ferreira et al, 2014), and achieve economies of scale and scope (Lodorfos & Boateng, 
2006). Firms undertake CBM&As whether for exploitation of synergies, growth 
opportunities, managers' interest in acquisitions, strengthening of market power or reaction 
to changes in the business environment (Višić, & Škrabić, 2010), accessing strategic assets 
and improve firm’s efficiency (Wu, 2014). In fact, Porter (1985) considers that the primary 
reason for an M&A is to achieve synergy by integrating two or more business units in a 
combination with an increased competitive advantage. Regardless of the motivations, 
CBM&As are a common and important response to globalization and the changing market 
environment (Lodorfos & Boateng, 2006) and assume great practical importance in 
strategic, monetary, and social terms (Gomes et al., 2013). 
M&As deals have very complex processes and involve various interconnected steps 
(Caiazza & Volpe, 2015; Very & Schweiger, 2001). So, it is important to understand how 
this process is conceived in the literature. According to Buczek (2016), there are three 
main phases of the M&A deal: preliminary, which is defined as the period in which the 
merging companies seek counterparts to such a transaction and establish initial contacts; 
the transaction phase, which serves as the starting point for the negotiations. In this phase, 
information is gathered to make a joint valuation of the merging entities; and finally, 
integration phase begins: the merged companies synchronize their business processes and 
organizational structure in order to achieve the economic synergies. Other authors propose 
that the M&A process can be decomposed into two periods: private takeover process and 
public takeover process, divided by three events (Boone & Mulherin, 2007) (See Figure 1).  
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Figure 1 - Acquisition process 
 
Source: Boone and Mulherin (2007) 
The private takeover process is the period from the private initiation of the takeover, 
to the first public announcement of the deal (Boone & Mulherin, 2007). In this phase, the 
bidder(s) obtain private information and manifest their preliminary interest. It involves 
negotiations between the potential acquirer(s) and the target firm, after a confidentiality 
agreement is signed (Dikova et al., 2010). Basically, both parties engage in initial 
negotiations and sign a preliminary contract (Muehlfeld et al., 2012). Even though a target 
firm may negotiate with multiple bidders, only one bidder makes a public offer for the deal 
(Dikova et al., 2010). The private takeover process ends when the deal is officially 
announced. This is the moment when it starts the public takeover period (Lim et al., 2014). 
In this intermediary phase, the acquirer firm gets additional information, assess risks and 
negotiate the terms of the deal (Ferreira et al., 2017). The completion of the deals is 
dependent on the approval from competition authorities and other regulatory agencies 
(Boone & Mulherin, 2007). So, this period may last for months or even years, extending 
the temporal hiatus between the formal announcement and the actual completion of the 
deal (Dikova et al., 2010; Ferreira et al., 2017). The official consummation date (informing 
the public about completion/ abandonment) marks the end of this phase (Muehlfeld et al., 
2012).  This master dissertation focuses on the public takeover phase: it begins with the 
announcement date and ends with the resolution date (completion). In addition to these 
phases, the M&A deal can be separated into two major parts: pre-merger and post-merger 
(Boland, 1970). The pre-merger phase begins once the decision to merge has been made, 
but the public announcement and all legal issues have not yet taken place (Appelbaum et 
al., 2000). The moment when ownership is transferred from the target to the acquiring firm 
sets this point.  
M&As are not completely understood and they are a phenomenon that has gained the 
attention from scholars (Reis, 2017).  In fact, CBM&As have interested scholars and 
practitioners for a long time (Caiazza & Volpe, 2015) and researchers have assumed 
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several paths regarding its motivations. For Stahl & Voigt (2008), companies acquire new 
companies purely for financial reasons or to improve competitiveness. Other studies focus 
on how new markets can leverage existing skills, maximize shareholder wealth and 
increase profits (Aoun et al., 2008) and on the learning potential of CBM&As (Barkema & 
Vermeulen, 1998; Hayward, 2002; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). CBM&As promote cost 
reduction by sharing resources, give access to new technologies and knowledge (Schriber, 
2012), to diversify product portfolio or customer service (Ciobanu, 2015). Scholars such as 
Iyer and Miller (2008) focused on integration and post-acquisition performance; Zou and 
Ghauri (2008) focused on knowledge sharing, and Toral (2008) suggests that firms can 
expand by strategic needs. In fact, research on CBM&As have focused on a number of 
important issues, such as entry mode or FDI (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998; Brouthers & 
Brouthers, 2000; Hennart & Reddy, 1997; Kogut & Singh, 1988;), performance outcomes 
from acquisitive entry (Brouthers, 2002; Li & Guisinger, 1991), and shareholders’ wealth 
creation by the CBM&As (Datta & Puia, 1995; Harris & Ravenscraft, 1991; Markides & 
Ittner, 1994; Morck & Yeung, 1992).  
More attention has been paid to post-acquisition issues, such as integration 
processes; integration processes from an employee viewpoint; post-acquisition turnover of 
acquired firm executives; post-acquisition performance of acquired and acquiring firms 
and the resulting knowledge transfer and organizational learning (Shimizu et al. 2004). 
Nevertheless, a lot of research has been done concerning the financial, economic and 
strategic aspects of M&As (Otterspeer, 2016), but little progress has been made in terms of 
empirical studies focusing on the pre-deal completion phase (Shimizu et al., 2004; Butler 
& Sauska, 2014). However, recently, there has been some studies regarding the pre-
completion phase of an M&A (Reis, 2017).  In terms of the pre-merger phase, the factors 
that have received significant attention from the scholars include choice and evaluation of 
the strategic partner; price paid and form of payment; power and status similarity between 
firms; accumulated merger experience and future compensation policies defined during the 
pre-merger stage (Stahl et al., 2013). However, several studies have been carried out in 
order to identify environmental differences between two countries that may have 
CBM&As: macroeconomic characteristics (Pablo, 2009), formal institutions such as laws 
and regulations (Dikova et al., 2009; Rossi & Volpin, 2004) or informal institutions such 
as culture (Dikova et al., 2009; Kogut & Singh, 1988). M&A research is quite fragmented 
with distinct approaches, contradictory results and lacking a unifying theory (Reis, 2017). 
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According to UNCTAD (2013), a substantial number of CBM&As have been 
withdrawn for regulatory or political reasons, such as competition issues, economic 
benefits tests and national security screening or political opposition. Studies suggest that 
the pursuit of CBM&As is not without challenges, mostly because crossing national 
borders adds uncertainty to the operations (Erel et al., 2012). The CBM&A process is 
complex and requires extensive information at its early stages. If too much time is spent in 
this stage it may cause the failure of the deal (Deminova, 2014). In fact, a large number of 
operations are abandoned after being announced (Zhang et al., 2011), and high rates of 
failure are commonly reported in the M&A literature, suggesting there are inherent 
complexities in merger process management that are yet to be fully understood (Stahl et 
al., 2013). Despite of the importance, there are hardly a few studies that analyze abandoned 
deals or completion likelihood of M&A negotiations (Lim et al., 2014). However, 
managers, researchers, and investors should still be aware to the hazards of M&A failure 
rates (Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006). 
2.2. Time to Completion 
Prolonged duration of the acquisition process has negative consequences for target 
and acquirer firms and bear significant costs for both parties (Dikova et al., 2010). 
Prolonged deal completion times give rise to vast direct costs (Luypaert & De Maeseneire, 
2015), it offers more room for competitors to initiate a bidding contest, resulting in a larger 
probability of deal abandonment (Luypaert & De Maeseneire, 2015). Additionally, 
prolonged deal duration may cause firms reputational losses (Muehlfeld et al., 2007), 
extra-legal charges and create diversion of managerial attention from other investment 
opportunities (Bainbridge, 1990; Dikova et al., 2010). Prolonged delays in completion can 
result in direct costs in the form of out-of-pocket expenditures and other indirect costs such 
as a lowered legitimacy, especially in foreign market entries (Cai et al., 2015). 
A considerable amount of CBM&As are delayed due to a variety of regulatory 
hurdles that companies must overcome (Ekelund et al., 2001). The decision to delay, or 
even to cancel, a previously announced CBM&A could also be driven by shareholders or 
managers of the acquiring or the target firm (Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2016). First and 
foremost, publicly-listed firms need approval from shareholders' meetings (Dikova et al. 
2010). Hostile deals and unsolicited deals on the bidder’s side are difficult to conclude 
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(Luypaert & de Maeseneire, 2015) and other mechanisms to defend takeovers on the target 
side may also increase deal duration (Cai et al., 2015). 
Some studies have focused on identifying the specific reasons for the cancellation of 
M&A (Dereeper, & Turki, 2013). However, there are only a handful of studies analyzing 
the process of deal announcement and deal completion and rationales beyond deal duration 
in the management literature (Cai et al., 2015). In fact, there is a deficiency of research on 
the completion likelihood of CBM&A deals (Reddy et al., 2016). Bick et al. (2017) used a 
sample of 4,381 M&As that occurred between United States firms, between 1985 to 2014. 
The authors examined the impact of proximity between target and acquirer as a measure of 
information asymmetry. The results suggest that time to completion increases for activity 
involving a smaller target firm as the geographical distance between firm’s increases. 
However, time to completion for deals involving large target firms decreases with 
additional geographic distance between firms in 2005–2014. 
Other scholars, such as Campa and Moschieri (2008) analyzed the main features of 
M&A activity in Europe in the period 2001-2007, by looking at a sample of 2,122 
CBM&As. Among other conclusions, not related with time to completion, the authors 
suggest that large transactions take longer to complete, while transactions paid in cash only 
are completed faster. In turn, Cai, et al. (2015) studied the effect of the quality of acquirer 
and target country institutional environment in cross-border acquisition deal duration, by 
analyzing 500 domestic deals and 155 cross-border deals in Brazilian firms, between 2000 
and 2014. The results indicate that regulatory agencies and merger control are very 
important determinants of deal duration by emerging market acquirers. Dikova et al. 
(2010) explore the role of formal and informal institutions and suggest that both forms of 
institutional distance between the firms’ countries negatively affect the likelihood that an 
announced cross-border acquisition deal will be completed. Based on 2,389 announced 
CBM&As deals in the global service industry between 1981 and 2001, the authors find 
evidence to support their hypotheses. The authors report that different elements of 
institutional distance such as expropriation risk distance, procedural complexity distance, 
power distance difference and uncertainty avoidance difference will influence the 
likelihood of deal completion and deal duration. Also, Ekelund et al., (2001) studied 
whether mergers in regulated industries take longer to complete than mergers that were not 
subject to the scrutiny of both antitrust and regulatory agencies. Using a sample of 553 
mergers during the years 1990 through 1998, the author’s statistical analysis indicates that 
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mergers in regulated industries do take longer to complete (160 days) than mergers in 
unregulated industries (94 days). 
Time to completion was also scrutinized by Ferreira et al. (2017) that used data from 
741 acquisitions of Brazilian firms between 2008 and 2012. The authors examine how 
institutional (cultural and regulatory), technological complexity and the effect of prior 
acquisition experience in Brazil impact on the time needed for deal completion. The results 
show that these factors do impact for hastening the process and that recent experience with 
acquisitions in Brazil shortens the time needed to complete the deal. Luypaert and De 
Maeseneire, (2015) also studied the antecedents of deal duration in a sample of 1,150 
M&As between listed US companies, from 1994 to 2011. The authors advocate that 
complexity critically affects time to completion: stock offers, deal hostility, mergers and 
larger deals are characterized by a lengthier acquisition duration. However, strong and 
clear shareholder support accelerates deal completion, as does the likelihood of 
overpayment, and experienced bidders succeed in more rapidly completing transactions, 
implying learning effects. Finally, Reis (2017) used a sample of 368 operations (attempted 
and completed) in seven South America countries from thirty-six countries, in 2012, using 
data on institutional distance between acquirer and target countries, using Berry et al. 
(2010) work. The results, however, have provided some mixed conclusions: while the 
geographic distance’s effect on time to completion was supported, administrative and 
knowledge distance were found to have a negative effect (meaning that it should reduce the 
time to completion) while a positive effect was expected. 
Despite the effort of scholars to understand the time it takes for an M&A deal to be 
completed (Dikova et al., 2010), the pre-completion phase of an M&A is still not fully 
understood, and it requires further research (Dikova et al, 2010; Reis, 2017). 
2.3. Institutional Environment 
Institutional Theory has its basis on Economics (North,1990) and Sociology (Scott, 
1995). The definition of institutions is not unanimous, however, they are often posited as 
“rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction” (North, 1990: 3) or “social structures that have attained a high 
degree of resilience (…) [that] provide stability and meaning to social life” (Scott, 1995: 
33). An institution-based view suggests nations differ significantly in formal and informal 
institutions (Scott, 1995). While formal institution defines the formal, legally sanctioned 
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rules of game, informal institutions refer to customs, norms and cultural values which 
describe the socially acceptable behaviors (Dikova et al., 2010; Kostova,1997; Scott, 
1995).  
Institutions matter (Peng et al., 2009). Institutions are important for the functioning 
of any economy, as they constrain or facilitate business (Meyer, 2001). Understanding the 
differences in institutional context between countries is critical for firms who operate 
abroad (Timothy & Laszlo, 2010). Institutional distance impacts the relative attractiveness 
of country’s markets, tradeoffs among foreign market entry strategies, the management of 
subsidiaries abroad, and firm performance (Bae & Solomon, 2010). The principal issue for 
CBM&As are the legal challenges, governance-related problems, general differences in the 
macroeconomic structure of both countries, uncertainties related to exchange rates and the 
reliability or unreliability of the local currency (Erel et al., 2012). Furthermore, there are 
differences in corporate culture, communication patterns, as well as differing compensation 
structures (Erel et al., 2012). Firms engaging in CBM&As face risks such as the ‘‘liability 
of foreignness’’ (Zaheer, 1995). Greater institutional distance increases the costs of doing 
business in a foreign country, because it is associated with greater uncertainty and non-
familiarity with the local environment (Zhang & Xu, 2017). Differences in customer 
preferences, business practices, national culture, and institutional forces, such as 
government regulations, can hinder firms from fully realizing their strategic objectives 
(Shimizu et al., 2004). Under the institutional perspective, firms must have legitimacy to 
operate in a certain country to overcome the liability of foreignness (Salomon & Wu, 2012; 
Zaheer, 1995) in terms of regulatory structures, governmental agencies, laws courts, 
professions, interest groups and public opinion (Oliver, 1991:147) in the target country.  
Institutional distance occupies a significant place in international business research 
(Salomon & Wu, 2012). Distance has been connected to the location choice ownership, 
entry mode and performance of foreign firms in addition to the contributions on the 
conceptualization and measurement of the construct (Salomon & Wu, 2012). Institutional 
distance seems to influence firms’ operations abroad (Bae & Salomon, 2010). When facing 
large institutional distance, acquirer firms may find it difficult to reconcile the different 
legitimacy requirements in the target country (Liou & Rao-Nicholson, 2017). Some 
scholars state that institutional distance has a negative impact on firms because they are 
confronted with costs in order to gain legitimacy (Hernández & Nieto, 2015). Perhaps that 
is the reason why institutional distance, particularly the cultural one (Wu, 2014) may 
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negatively impact the firm’s performance (Liou & Rao-Nicholson, 2017). Institutional 
distance negatively influences FDI (Bailey & Li, 2015; Bénassy‐Quéré et al., 2007; 
Lankhuizen et al, 2011). Kostova and Zaheer (1999) suggest that the institution distance 
between acquirer and target countries brings less FDI due to difficulties in organization 
practices and implementation. Zhang and Xu (2017) posit that institutional distance is a 
key factor that affects MNEs entry mode choices. In fact, legal, political and administrative 
systems tend to be the internationally framework whose costs determine in international 
attractiveness of a location (Bevan et al., 2004). The institutional structure may provide 
entry barriers, such as legal restrictions on ownership. Foreign governments sometimes 
adopt restrictions to protect domestic owners from outsiders (Shimizu et al., 2004). 
Actually, Di Guardo et al. (2016) posit that the distance is a critical factor in the probability 
of one firm performs a CBM&A deal. Institutional distance increases information 
asymmetry between partners which could augments the likelihood of an M&A deal to fail 
and enlarge the time it takes to complete a deal (Reis, 2017). On the other hand, Wu (2014) 
suggest that formal institutional distance (political, economic and administrative) 
positively affect firm performance. Equally, Lankhuizen et al. (2011) results did not offer 
robust support for a negative effect of institutional distance on either trade or FDI. 
Firms undertaking CBM&A deals in institutionally more distant countries are more 
likely to withdraw the deal (Dikova et al., 2010). Several researchers suggest that not only 
deal and firm specific factors, but also investor protection, macroeconomic indicators, 
financial markets development, border tax policies, government and bureaucrat’s behavior, 
political influence and cultural factors have different effects on the completion likelihood 
of CBM&A deals (Reddy et al., 2016). Extant literature on CBM&A suggests that “deal 
success and the time required for deal completion” are influenced by organizational and 
deal specific characteristics, and importantly, country-specific factors such as economic 
indicators, institutional laws, political factors, and cultural issues (Dikova et al., 2010; Erel 
et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2011). Additionally, greater institutional distance between the 
acquirer and target countries, delays the time required to complete a publicly announced 
transaction (Reddy et al., 2016). Rather than taking institutions as an immutable constraint 
when making decisions, a firm can cultivate and exploit its ability to successfully manage 
diverse institutional distances in its target country environment (Henisz & Delios, 2000). 
Hence, it is crucial that additional research on institutional distances and on M&A deals is 
conducted, since this phenomenon it is not yet fully understood (Reis, 2017). 
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Firms that operate abroad must face significant differences between home and host 
countries’ institutions. The differences or similarities in the institutions are often posited as 
distances (Kostova, 1999). For Xu and Shenkar (2002: 608) is “the extent of similarity or 
dissimilarity between the regulatory, cognitive, and normative institutions of two 
countries”. This definition is built upon Scott’s (1995) three institutional pillars: 
Regulatory, Normative and Cognitive. Regulatory institutions refer to the formally 
codified, enacted, and enforced structure of laws in a community, society, or nation; 
Normative institutions are less formal and are typically manifest in standards and 
commercial conventions such as those established by professional and trade associations, 
and business groups. Finally, cognitive institutions are the axiomatic beliefs about the 
expected standards of behavior that are specific to a culture, which are typically learned 
through social interactions by living or growing up in a community or society (Manolova 
et al, 2008). The differences or similarities in the institutions are often posited as distances 
(Kostova, 1999) and may be different for each of the institutional pillars (Kostova et al., 
2008). 
Nevertheless, other types of institutions may be used. North (1990) considered 
formal and informal institutions. Ghemawat (2001) developed the “CAGE” model based 
on this theory. CAGE model categorizes institutions on Cultural, Administrative, 
Geographic and Economic distances. Cultural distance comprises the social and human 
norms, language and education differences between countries; geographic distance is the 
actual gravity distance between countries’ major cities in miles or kilometers; 
administrative distance implies the political and bureaucratic environment differences 
between host and home countries; economic distance includes national economic 
differences such as GDP or the exchange rate. More recently, Berry et al. (2010) proposed 
a framework with nine dimensions that summarizes most of the previous institutional 
distance research (Wu, 2014): political, economic, cultural, financial, knowledge, global-
connectedness, demographic, administrative and geographical distance. Berry et al. (2010) 
have created three new distances: demographic, knowledge and global-connectedness 
distances. With regard to political institutions, Kaufmann constructs six indicators: voice 
and accountability, political stability and lack of violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (Kaufmann et al., 1999, 
Kaufmann et al., 2007, Kaufmann et al., 2009). In every case, institutional distance is 
considered the extent to which the institutions of two given countries differ and influence 
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firms (Berry et al., 2010). My study partially adopts this framework to discuss institutional 
influences on CBM&As time to completion. Table 1 represents the institutional 
dimensions of distance studied in this dissertation and that were used in previous studies. 
Table 1 - Dimensions of distance and examples of previous studies 
Dimensions of distance Previous studies 
Economic Campa & Guillén (1999);  
Political Guler & Guillén (2010); Karunaratne (2012); Kwok & 
Tedesse (2006); Toral (2008); Yu & Liao, (2008) 
Administrative Guler & Guillén (2010); Newburry &Yakova (2006); Schriber 
(2012) 
 
Cultural 
Hofstede (1980); Johanson & Vahlne (1977); Kogut & Singh 
(1988); Morosini et al. (1998); Sarala & Vaara (2010); Sun e 
Xu (2010); Tihanyi et al. (2005) 
Source: Author 
Berry et al’s. (2010) dimensions and component variables are explained in table 2A 
in appendix, however a more directed explanation of the institutional distances that I use in 
this work are provided in the following subsections of this dissertation. 
2.3.1. Political Distance 
Political distance refers to the differences between countries in terms of political 
stability, democracy, and trade bloc membership (Berry et al., 2010). It denotes the 
country’s differences in the development of market-supporting institutions (Liou & Rao-
Nicholson, 2017). This means that political differences emphasize the differences in 
political systems, democratic character and trade relationships (Bailey & Li, 2015). 
Governments influence, and sometimes dominate transactions within an economy 
through laws, regulations, and institutions (Rodriguez et al., 2005). Political institutions are 
relevant as they may determine issues such as tax rates, regulations, restrictions to foreign 
trade and investments (Chan et al., 2008) and reduce transaction costs by improving the 
security of property rights and contract enforcement (Chan et al., 2008; North, 1997; 
Rodriguez et al., 2005). Governments may protect local firms by hindering operations from 
a foreigner firm or, on the contrary, seek to attract foreign investments (Chan et al., 2008; 
North, 1990). This means that policies issued and followed by political institutions may 
hinder or promote the international operations of firms, especially the host country policies 
(Henisz & Zelner, 2005). Political institutions can influence and affect firm’s operation 
whether that by the possibility of expropriation or nationalization of the investment, or 
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other government actions or unexpected changes in the political situation that could have a 
negative effect on economic activity (Kobrin, 1979; Robock, 1971). So, it is important for 
firms to understand the political environment in which they are going to operate, be aware 
of the differences between both countries and to be prepared for unexpected changes.  
Political distance measures most often used in the international business literature 
emphasize the effectiveness of political institutions and the uncertainty of the political 
environment (Bae & Salomon, 2010). Kaufmann et al. (2007), measured six features of 
political institutions: political stability, government effectiveness; voice and accountability, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. However, in this dissertation, I 
will use Berry et al. (2010) framework. 
Political distance between countries in international business has not received 
sufficient attention in recent literature (Umana Dajud, 2013). However, political distance 
has been examined on political instability, government systems (Berry et al.,2010) and 
entry modes (Dai et al., 2013), survival of a subsidiary (Henisz, 2000) or location decisions 
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Some studies suggest that political systems with predictable 
rules minimize the risks of internationalization and increase the likelihood of FDI 
(MacCarthy & Atthirawong, 2003) and that stable and open-policy institutions attract more 
inward M&As in the OECD countries (Wu, 2014). Thus, organizations tend to maximize 
their utility and minimize risk by internationalizing into more politically developed 
countries (Kraus et al., 2015).  
Political uncertainty plays a significant role in firm investment and behavior (Henisz, 
2000). Henisz and Delios (2000) found that firms take lower levels of equity ownership in 
subsidiaries located in politically unstable countries. The uncertainty and risk related to 
differences in political institutions between countries affect the stability of their markets, 
which affects foreign companies aiming to do business there (Quer et al., 2012). Although 
uncertain political conditions often discourage investment in the first place (Henisz & 
Macher, 2004), firms can develop strategies to decrease the risk associated with operating 
in politically volatile environment (Henisz & Delios, 2000). In fact, Quer et al. (2012) 
suggest that Chinese firms tend to invest in countries with higher levels of risk. By 
capturing political vulnerability and adapting to different political institutions in the target 
country, firms gain legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The greater the political distance 
foreign firms face, the more difficult it becomes for them to anticipate changes in the host 
country and to operate effectively (Martin et al., 2010; Gaur & Lu, 2007). Thus, 
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performing deals, such as CBM&A is easier for acquirers to adapt to target country’s 
political institutions if they are similar to the political institutions of the home country 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Besides that, political institutions can quick CBM&As with 
less time and money consumed on dealing with local governments and rules; as a result, 
reduce transaction costs of doing business in the host country (Kaufmann et al., 2007). 
This means that political distance also leads to uncertainty and costs (Berry et al., 2010). 
2.3.2. Economic Distance 
Economic institutions determine the constraints and the incentives for economic 
activity (North, 1990). The differences in the institutions are described by economic 
distance, which are referred as the dissimilarities among countries, regarding the economic 
activity such as consumers income level and distribution, consumer habit of consumption, 
level of inequality, consumer wealth and the cost and quality of natural, financial, human 
resources, infrastructure and information or knowledge (Ghemawat, 2001), inflation rates 
and intensity of trade (Berry et al., 2010). Basically, economic distance refers to the 
economic development difference between the acquirer and target markets (Liou & Rao-
Nicholson, 2017) and considers cross-country differences in patterns of exchange, 
economic structure, market orientation, and market stability (Ghemawat, 2001; Miller & 
Parkhe, 2002).  
Despite having a great importance in international businesses, economic distance has 
received less attention than the other distance dimensions, possibly because it is not 
considered a key factor identified in institutional economics or new institutionalism (Bae & 
Salomon, 2010). Besides that, patterns of exchange, economic structure may be seen as the 
result of firms and markets reacting to regulatory, political, and cultural institutions (Bae & 
Salomon, 2010). However, some authors in international business have studied the effect 
of economic distance on the choice of foreign market and entry mode (Berry et al., 2010). 
Though, other studies were conducted. For instance, studies suggest that resemblance in 
economic institutions encourages economic exchange (two countries or trading blocs will 
have greater trade and investment if they are closer in economic size) (Bae & Salomon, 
2010); other authors suggest that foreign banks may operate less efficiently when their 
home country’s financial market orientation is very different from that of the host country 
(Bae & Salomon, 2010); scholars advance that firms are more likely to agglomerate in 
economically risky; and other found that geographic proximity, weighted by economic 
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development (investment, education levels, and the availability of resources) positively 
affects location choices (Bae & Salomon, 2010). 
Economic distance often reflects differences in factor costs and in technological 
capability between two countries (Tsang & Yip, 2007). So, we can consider that two 
countries, with a relevant economic distance, will also have pertinent technological 
distance. The technological level reflects the knowledge bases and expertise level of one 
country (Favre, 2014). Thus, the more differences between the technological level of two 
countries, the more challenging it will be for firms to enhance their ability to share 
knowledge and communicate.  
The investment through CBM&A in a certain country is driven by their economy 
characteristics (Ciobanu & Bahna, 2015). In fact, economic difference between the 
countries where the target and acquirer come from also determine the likelihood of a 
CBM&A (Pablo, 2009). When internationalizing to a country with a dissimilar profile, the 
firm must adapt its business model. In contrast, if the country presents a similar economic 
environment it facilitates CBM&A (Malhotra et al., 2009), because it is easier for the firm 
to replicate the already existing business model and to directly apply its processes and 
knowledge (Wu, 2014). Thus, the similarity of the economy is a factor for the development 
and the performance of the CBM&A, influencing the easiness of applying the business 
model, processes and products in the new market. The smaller the similarity between 
economic profiles, the higher the economic distance and the harder the adaptation, 
influencing negatively the CBM&A performance (Ramos, 2017). This means that similar 
economic institutions in home and host countries have a positive influence in the 
performance of a firm, much in the same way that economic institutions in acquirer and 
target countries would decrease uncertainty and allow for deals to be completed (Reis, 
2017). 
The smaller the economic distance between the acquirer and target countries, the 
more similar the countries are in terms of their income and wealth profiles, reflected in the 
attitudes and lifestyles of the consumers (Campbell et al., 2012) and thus the more alike 
they should be in their consumer purchasing power and preferences, macroeconomic 
stability and the openness of the economy to external influences (Berry et al., 2010). 
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2.3.3. Administrative Distance 
There are several synonyms to address to administrative distance. Some call it 
“governance”, “administrative” or “regulatory” distance, but all of them can be defined as 
the extent to which the administrative system of one country, meaning, laws, regulations 
and government policies, differ from another (Ghemawat, 2001; Xu & Shenkar, 2002). 
This means that administrative distance refers to the distance resulting from differences in 
societal institutions. It underlines differences in bureaucratic patterns due to colonial ties, 
languages, religions, and legal systems (Berry et al., 2010). Informal ties between countries 
developed through colonization, shared language, shared religion, and common origin of 
the legal system are path-dependent and tend to have persistent effects (Makino &Tsang, 
2011). When countries share colonial history, language, religion and legal systems, there is 
little, or no uncertainty associated with transactions a result, firms are likely to find that 
with relatively low information costs, it is relatively easy to gain legitimacy in the target 
country that is closer to the acquirer country in an administrative dimension (Konara & 
Wei, 2014). 
Several studies in international business field were conducted regarding 
administrative distance. Firms entering countries with a radically different administrative 
system experience high levels of uncertainty and will find it difficult to successfully 
business there (Timothy & Laszlo, 2010). Olie (1994) advance that the degree of 
compatibility of administrative practices between countries, contribute to explain the 
difficulties encountered in the post-merger integration process in a CBM&A. Authors such 
as Xu et al. (2004) propose that large regulatory distance leads firms to choose lower 
ownership stakes in their foreign subsidiaries. In fact, Xu & Shenkar (2002) suggested that 
firms are more likely to enter in countries through minority-owned joint ventures rather 
than through wholly or majority owned ventures. In turn, Habib & Zurawicki (2002) found 
that greater absolute differences in corruption levels between countries lead to smaller FDI 
flows between them. Other researchers argue that administrative factors such as colonial 
ties (Frankel & Rose, 2002), language (Johanson & Vahle, 1977), religion (Ghemawat, 
2001), or legal systems (Berry et al., 2010; Porta et al., 1998) strongly influence a firm's 
strategic decisions (Bailey & Li, 2015). Above that, legal system is significant in 
explaining the number of M&A’s in the world (Ciobanu & Bahna, 2015). In turn, Hejazi & 
Ma (2011) propose that language affects FDI stocks. Instead of focusing on the 
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administrative distance between target and acquirer countries, some studies focused on 
aspects of the administrative quality of the target country. Globerman and Shapiro (2003) 
advance that countries with a high-quality administrative system receive more US FDI; 
Habib and Zurawicki (2002) found that corrupt countries receive significantly less FDI 
than non-corrupt ones, probably because corruption are known for creating a higher 
administrative distance for depressing trade and investment (Ramos, 2017). Complex 
administrative environments create situations that inhibit CBM&A activity (Vermeulen & 
Barkema, 2001). Examining administrative aspects has contributed to elucidate the 
effectiveness of new international business between countries with greater proximity and 
their influence on managerial decisions for multinational companies (Henisz, 2000). 
Despite the debate whether regulatory distance is truly conceptually distinct from 
political distance (Bae & Solomon, 2010), I have considered Berry et al. (2010) approach 
that considers that they are different. The inclusion of the influence between colonized 
colonizer, common language, legal and religious institutions in the measures finds 
justification for breaking the national political systems, originate formal and informal 
institutional arrangements that transcend the purely political nature of the nation-state 
(Berry et al., 2010). So, administrative distance is determined by historical and political 
associations that are the reflection of these rules, norms and principles (Ramos, 2017). 
2.3.4. Cultural Distance 
Culture consists of beliefs, values, and norms (Scott, 1995). Values define what is 
desirable, while norms define how things should be done (Bae & Solomon, 2010). These 
normalize the behavior of organizational actors within societies (Hofstede, 1980; North, 
1991; Scott, 1995). Culture is measured by indicators of individual values and beliefs, such 
as trust and respect for others, and confidence in individual self-determination (Tabellini, 
2010). Cultural values underlie the rules that determine how institutions function (Sousa & 
Bradley, 2008) and affect the way people interact in organizations and in groups. People 
are rarely fully aware of their own national cultural values which are path dependent and 
transferred from generation to generation, and reinforced by institutions (Olie, 1990).  
National cultural distance is defined as the degree to which cultural norms, routines 
and repertoires for organizational design, new product development, and other aspects of 
management in one country are different from those in another country (Kogut & Singh, 
1988). Cultural distance reflects how individuals from different countries observe and react 
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differently to certain behaviors and their attitudes towards authority, trust, family and work 
(Berry et al., 2010). Strategic decisions and actions of top managers are often influenced 
by their cultural background (Hofstede, 1980). People of different cultures will encounter 
similar problems but view them from different angles (Reus & Lamont, 2009), so cultural 
distance is closely linked to information asymmetry that exists between the negotiating 
parties to a transaction (Wu, 2014). Cultural distance can lead to difficulties in 
communication and coordination between firms, reducing operational effectiveness. It can 
also make the local market more difficult to understand and thus to penetrate successfully 
(Bae & Solomon, 2010). It is, therefore, crucial that cultural differences are recognized and 
accommodated by the manager (Sousa & Bradley, 2008). 
Cultural distance is the most widely studied concept in CBM&A research (Wu, 
2014). The first papers to address the cultural encounter in CBM&A were by Olie (1990), 
who focused CBM&A integration, highlighting that both organizational and national 
cultures meet in CBM&As (Faulkner et al., 2012). International business literature has 
focus enormously in cultural differences between countries, but the findings of researchers 
on their effect on CBM&As are, however, contradictory (Reis, 2017). While some authors 
argue that cultural differences can be a source of value creation, innovation and learning 
(Morosini et al., 1998; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001) others state that cultural differences 
lead to misunderstandings and conflicts (Datta & Puia, 1995). Some studies have argued 
that cultural differences do not always have a negative impact on M&A performance 
(Gomes et al., 2013). In fact, studies consider that there is a benefit for firms to operate in 
countries with cultural distance (Stahl & Voigt, 2008). Morosini et al. (1998) suggest that 
there is a positive relation between cultural distance and firm performance. In turn, 
Brouthers and Brouthers (2001) found a counter-intuitive result in their studies, further 
known as the “cultural distance paradox”. This paradox is explained in the literature by 
greater cultural distance maybe offers firms a different set of resources which may 
complement the existing pool of resources (Morosini et al., 1998), or because firms may 
require higher control to cope with uncertainty which arises with cultural distance, namely 
in interacting with local firms (Slangen & Hennart, 2008). On the contrary, other studies 
support the idea that cultural distance has a negative impact on firms’ operations. Some 
studies suggest that firms prefer higher equity participations when cultural distance factor 
is low or, when performing foreign direct investment, firms prefer locations with lower 
cultural distance (Reis, 2017). For instance, Xu and Li (2011) indicated that cultural 
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distance is negatively correlated with China’s FDI, meaning that the greater cultural 
difference between China and the target country, the less FDI to that country. The greater 
cultural distance between countries may lead to misunderstandings (Adler, 1997; Lincoln 
et al., 1981). Consequently, similarity in national culture, or smaller cultural distance, 
facilitates interaction, while dissimilarity or greater cultural distance hinders it (Sousa & 
Bradley, 2008). Cultural differences are, often claimed to be the major cause of the high 
failures rates in M&As (King et al., 2004). And, the proximity increases the number of 
CBM&As between countries (Malhotra et al., 2009, Shimizu et al., 2004). Regardless of 
the field of study, cultural differences between target and acquirer countries, there are 
several challenges for the acquirer (Dikova & Sahib, 2013) and they do matter in 
CBM&As (Otterspeer, 2016). 
Hofstede’s work has some limitations (Shenkar, 2001), however it is used in this 
dissertation, because previous studies have shown that the results are still valid and very 
valuable, especially for M&As researches (Kirkman et al, 2006). In fact, Hofstede’s work 
is the more widely adopted measure of national cultural distance in international business 
(Bae & Salomon, 2010). 
Due to the difficulty of integrating an already existing foreign management, cultural 
differences are likely to be especially important the case of an acquisition (Kogut & Singh, 
1988). When firms enter in an institutional environment with a different set of rules, they 
must meet social expectations to demonstrate social responsibility and build social 
legitimacy in the host country (Quer et al., 2012). Hence, negotiations in the context of a 
CBM&A require the acquiring firms not only to attend the local traditions and etiquette, 
but also to understand the deeper and subtle governance and decision-making processes 
shaped by national cultures (Ahammad et al., 2016). Culture represents an important 
element of CBM&As process (Lodorfos & Boateng, 2006). 
2.4. European Union 
Regional integration is a shifting of certain national activities toward a new center 
(Haas, 1958). Integration, therefore, is a form of collective action among countries in order 
to obtain a certain goal. This goal can be as great as political unification, as it is in the case 
of the EU (Feng & Genna, 2003). The purposes of trade blocs are better economic welfare 
for its members, prosperity, access to a secure and large market, growth in employment, 
and defense against other alliances/trading blocs (Barker & Kaynak, 1992). To accomplish 
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these goals, trade blocs try to facilitate trade and to reduce export barriers between its 
member countries (Korneliussen & Blasius, 2008).  
EU is the most powerful trading bloc in the world (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006). 
However, EU was not always as big as it is today. The oldest of the regional blocs was 
born in the bipolar environment of the Cold War (Magnoli, 1997). Historically, internal 
trade liberalization and external trade policy served as the glue to bind together the former 
enemies within Europe (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006). Europe had as major objective to 
strengthen economic cooperation on the assumption that the countries are dependent on 
economic activity and that this will helps to avoid possible conflicts. Since then, EU has 
been through a gradual process that reached the level of a large single market, with a 
common currency. What initially began as a union of economic interests, quickly became 
an active organization with an immense range of areas, ranging from development aid to 
the environment. 
EU has a unique institutional framework (see table 3A in appendix). European 
integration deliberately attempted to harmonize institutions and policies in several areas, 
establishing common benchmarks and targets for institutional improvement (Alesina et al., 
2017).The EU main priorities are defined by the European Council which brings together 
national and EU-level leaders; directly elected MEPs represent European citizens in the 
European Parliament; the interests of the EU, as a whole, are upheld by the European 
Commission, whose members are appointed by national governments; and governments 
defend their own country's national interests in the Council of the EU. The European 
Council Provides impetus and direction: it sets the EU’s overall political direction but has 
no powers to pass laws. This institution is let by a President and comprising national head 
of state or government and the President European Commission. There are three main 
institutions involved in EU legislation: The European Parliament (which represents the EU 
citizens and is elected by them); the Council of the EU (represents the governments of each 
member country. The president of the Council is shared by the member states on a rotating 
basis); and the European Commission (that represents the interests of the EU as a whole) 
(Europa.eu) Regarding trade negotiations, Europe is formally represented by the European 
Commission.  The large experience in negotiating international trade agreements on behalf 
of its state members have made the EU an essential player and a powerful bargainer in the 
multilateral trading system (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006). Besides these important 
institutions, EU has two others with fundamental roles, that are the Court of Justice and the 
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Court of Auditors. Other institutions have specialized roles: The European Central bank; 
European External Actions Service; European Economic and Social Committee; European 
Committee of the Regions; European Investment Bank; European Investment 
Fund; European Ombudsman; European Data Protection Supervisor; Publications 
Office; European Personnel Selection Office; European School of Administration and 
other specialized agencies and decentralized bodies (Europa.eu). 
Integration reduces the uniqueness of institutional structures among countries (Alhor 
et al., 2008). It increases access to sources of financing, research and educational facilities, 
and skilled labor pools, which improves the level of entrepreneurial activity (Alhor et al., 
2008). The Treaty of Rome was specifically designed to promote economic exchange 
across national borders (Europa.eu). Fligstein and Stone Sweet (2002) identified a self-
reinforcing cycle of reduced barriers to cross-border economic activity and increasing 
integration. In fact, “the process through which barriers to cross-border economic activity 
within Europe are removed… and the process through which common, supranational 
public policies are made and enforced … are not distinct processes but are endogenous to 
one another” (Fligstein & Stone Sweet (2002) pp. 1209–1210). Integration process of the 
group and the homogeneity of economic institutions across countries, must reinforce each 
other in order for an economic union to appear (Feng & Genna, 2003). Hence, one would 
expect to see institutional convergence in Europe (Alesina et al., 2017). In fact, an explicit 
goal of the process of European integration was the harmonization of policies and 
institutions. Europe often provided standards and incentives for harmonization and to 
diffuse best practices (Alesina et al., 2017). The integration process of EU refers to the 
incremental development in the areas of mobility and exchanges of goods, services, labor 
and capital, among member states, the existence and influence of supranational agency 
overseeing economic relationships among states, as well as the coordination of fiscal and 
monetary policies. Integration improves when member countries are able to reduce the 
variance of their economic institutions. So, integration reduce the heterogeneity of 
economic institutions (Feng & Genna, 2003). EU has focused on removing barriers to the 
full integration of its members’ economies (Cyrus, 2015). The removal of barriers to trade 
and capital mobility within the EU has changed the permeability of national borders and 
hence the locational advantages of member states and the Union as a whole (Barrell & 
Pain, 1999). In addition, control of immigration, environmental protection, foreign policy, 
defense against terrorism, a common army, research, and innovation may all be best 
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addressed at the European rather than at the national level (Alesina et al., 2017). The EU 
has emerged as a great accomplishment by bringing member countries together in a 
cohesive political and economic unit (Feng & Genna, 2003). This means that the role of 
institutional distance in determining trade flows may to be neutralized when EU countries 
are trading with each other (Aylward, 2016). 
The ongoing harmonization of Europe’s political environment has started a process 
of corporate restructuring throughout Europe (Bley & Madura, 2003). Europe has 
undergone fundamental changes in political structure following the collapse of the 
communist bloc, formal and informal trade barriers have been removed or reduced because 
of deepening and widening regional integration (Kokko & Tingvall, 2014).  EU It is the 
result of a process of political integration between the nation-states of Europe (Hix & 
Høyland, 1999).  
Political integration is mainly based on welfare increasing effects of integrated policy 
making (Molle, 2006). This means that EU is able to affect other countries’ policies and 
positions (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006). International political integration has occurred in 
Europe, where nation states have imposed limits on their sovereign use of certain policies 
and have delegated control over some relevant competencies, such as trade policy and 
antitrust (Brou & Ruta, 2011). There is a negative side of political integration, because the 
policy of one country has effects in another. For instance, if the objectives of two countries 
are inconsistent, the policy of one country will frustrate the policy of the other. However, 
Coricelli et al. (2016) suggest that the growth and productivity effect from deep integration 
(meaning, political benefits from EU membership) are substantially positive. So, it seems 
to pay-off being an EU state member.  
Economic integration includes mechanisms such as developing common markets, 
eliminating tariffs, and creating common currencies, which all support market incentives 
for entrepreneurial strategies (Alhor et al., 2008). For instance, being part of the Eurozone 
makes it possible for the EU state members to transfer economic resources from countries 
with healthy economies to those suffering economic setbacks; such actions work to 
improve the aggregate economic situation of the integrated area in the long run (Alhor et 
al., 2008). Besides, the static and dynamic gains from regional integration schemes result 
in both long and short run economic gains (Benito et al., 2003). Entering into higher levels 
of economic integration, countries are likely to stimulate their cross-border entrepreneurial 
activity since such activity is directly associated with cross-border venture capital 
26 
 
investment flows to and from other member nations (Alhor et al., 2008). In fact, since the 
beginning of the century, M&A activity has increased, especially in Europe (Moschieri & 
Campa, 2014). In fact, the rise of M&A activity in 2000s may be driven by the increasing 
legal and economic integration of European countries and to the introduction of the Euro 
(Campa & Moschieri, 2008). Europe has become an attractive market to foreign investors 
and researchers believe that this is a consequence of the European Commission's 
intervention to create a homogeneous and fertile ground for corporate acquisitions in 
Europe (Moschieri & Campa, 2014). Besides, the introduction of the Euro, deregulation 
and privatization, technological innovation and the globalization process, have encouraged 
EU companies to take part in M&As deals (Campa & Moschieri, 2008). 
Increasing integration in the EU is reducing the administrative distance between 
member states (Angué & Mayrhofer, 2009). In EU, common legislation and coordination 
occurs through the structure of supra-regional institutions, which results in a convergence 
of issues such as tax rates, quality of infrastructure, competition law, incentive schemes, 
corporate governance, procurement regulations, etc. (Eliassen & Monsen, 2001). There are 
three main institutions involved in EU legislation: The European Parliament, the Council 
of the EU and the European Commission (Europa.eu). The primary source of law and 
policy-making power in the EU are the Treaties. New treaties need to be ratified by all 
member governments and they are the basis or ground rules for all EU action. the Treaties 
constitute the ultimate source of mandate and legitimacy for all EU institutions and for all 
their legislative and judicial authority. Secondary legislation comprises a broad and 
differentiated range of binding and non-binding legal instruments. includes regulations, 
directives and decisions – are derived from the principles and objectives set out in the 
treaties (Alesina et al.,2005). Legislation in the EU is typically initiated and prepared by 
the Commission, who can also sign legislative acts. Before the Maastricht Treaty, other 
legislative acts were signed only by the Council. Pressures from the European Parliament 
have resulted in the so-called co-decision procedure, where the Parliament also must sign 
(and with its refusal can veto) certain acts (Alesina et al.,2005). 
In Europe, the effects of cultural distance between the countries are particularly 
relevant (Aylward, 2016). In table 4A, in appendix, it is possible to see a brief analysis on 
the cultural dimensions in Europe.  Each European country has specific cultural values 
(Aureli & Demartini, 2010), but the continuing process of globalization in Europe may 
have reduced cultural differences between them (Kokko & Tingvall, 2014). Free 
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movement of people within EU state members is one of the most fundamental freedoms 
(Vandenbrande et al., 2006) and as individuals move, they join new ingroups (Triandis, 
1989), allowing interaction and integration into new cultures. This interaction may lead to 
a more homogeneous culture within the EU. In fact, there are studies that support the 
assumption that countries in Europe can be systematically clustered within culture clusters 
(House et al., 2004; Kolman et al.,2003; Ronen & Shenkar, 1985). Other studies test 
whether culture in European regions has a causal effect on the economic development 
(Tabellini, 2010), and an explorative study on European CBM&A suggest that national 
culture differences play an important role in affecting acquirer’s perceptions of target 
companies, which have important consequences for the negotiation of the deals (Ahammad 
et al., 2016).  
The harmonizing legal basis within the EU for cross-border mergers occurred via 
Cross-Border Merger Directive (CBMD) (Campa & Moschieri, 2008). This mechanism 
was necessary to block the problems that are believed to arise in a cross-border framework 
(Dutcik, 2017). The CBMD applies to mergers when at least two of the merging companies 
are from different EU Member States. By introducing this Directive, the European 
legislator intended to increase the mobility of companies within the EU by providing the 
tools to companies to restructure and cooperate at the European level (Dutcik, 2017). The 
directive aimed to create favorable conditions for the emergence of a European market for 
corporate control: efficient takeover mechanisms, a common regulatory framework and 
strong rights for shareholders (European-Commission, 2007). The purpose of the directive 
was to create conditions for the development of an active, cross-border European market 
for corporate control, to help exploit the benefits of a harmonized market for takeovers at 
European level, and to promote integration of European capital markets (European-
Commission, 2007). Although the CBMD harmonizes M&A legislation across the EU, it 
still allows deviation at national level, because member states can choose not to execute 
the provisions on takeover defenses at the national level (Campa & Moschieri, 2008). This 
means that domestic governments can oppose to a merger in order to protect ‘public 
interests’ (Serdar Dinc & Erel, 2013). Besides, CBMD guidelines are still restricted to 
acquirers from the EU. The same rules do not necessarily apply to outside EU acquirers, 
for the same European target firm (Campa & Moschieri, 2008). Nevertheless, CBMD has 
positive effects. It made mergers possible in all EU member states by improving the 
effectiveness with simplified procedures and, most important, it resolved some issues 
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related to conflicts between different domestic laws of EU member states (Dutcik, 2017). 
This directive provided a clear and predictable framework for carrying out cross-border 
mergers within the EU, which permitted that these deals happened in a fast, predictable, 
structured and less costly way (Dutcik, 2017). This means that is a positive effect, because 
the success of the transaction is greater, which is shown by the growth of mergers and 
acquisitions market (Ciobanu, 2015). The deregulation of many economic sectors has 
decreased the cost of making corporate acquisitions across European borders. (Moschieri 
& Campa, 2014). For all the motives mentioned above, EU seems to be as important 
variable to consider in this study. 
3. Conceptual Development 
In this section, I argue that institutional distance influences CBM&As time to 
completion, and that EU membership moderate the effect of institutional distance on 
CBM&As time to completion. I develop a framework which summarizes the different 
relationship between the variables. In the following subsections I develop hypotheses 
based on the literature. Four hypotheses test whether the institutional distance influence 
CBM&As time to completion, and another four test whether the EU membership has a 
moderating effect on the relationship between institutional distances and CBM&As time to 
completion. 
Firms face several problems when acquiring in another country (Very & 
Schweiger, 2001). According to CBM&A literature, internal factors (firm and deal 
specific) and external factors (country level factors) determine the success of CBM&A 
deals. The reasons behind the unsuccessful deals include firm-specific factors (status of the 
firm, ownership structure, and previous acquisition experience), deal-specific factors (deal 
structure, deal type, payment mode, advisors to the deal, and their experience), and 
external factors (institutional issues such as political, legal, and socio-cultural differences) 
(Reddy et al., 2016). In fact, rules, regulations, and norms of doing business in foreign 
countries can be quite different from those in MNEs’ home countries. Such differences 
present challenges for acquirer firms (Gaur & Lu, 2007). The lack of market transparency 
in relation to M&As relevant facts: such as shareholders, accounting differences, country 
restrictions, currency control regulations, tax laws, other legal hurdles such as 
environmental issues, ethical problems, anti-trust law or knowing how to negotiate in a 
particular country, due to limitations of knowledge regarding that particular country (Very 
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& Schweiger, 2001) are some of them. National boundaries between countries are 
indicative of economic, social, political, demographic, geographic, legal and cultural 
dimensions that differ among countries and comprise the national institutions (Berry et al., 
2010) and that may have impact on CBM&As time to completion (Dikova et al., 2010). 
First of all, it is crucial to consider this important premise:  Institutional distance 
impacts firm performance (Bae & Salomon, 2010). The speed in which a CBM&A deal is 
completed, or the number of days taken from the announcement of the deal until its 
completion, is an important barometer of the success and efficiency of a deal. (Cai et al., 
2015) and is considered by managers, of both target and the acquirer firms, as a measure of 
a firm’s performance (Shimizu et al., 2004). Therefore, it is important to assess the impact 
of institutional distance on CBM&As completion. We scrutinize the effect of institutional 
distance considering four dimensions: political distance, economic distance, administrative 
distance and cultural distance (Berry et al., 2010). 
3.1. Political Distance  
Political institutions determine issues such as tax rates, laws, regulations, restrictions 
to foreign trade and investment and government protection on private property and 
intellectual property (Chan et al., 2008) and are key determinants of CBM&As decision 
(Ciobanu & Bahna, 2015). This means that governments influence and, sometimes, 
dominate transactions within an economy (Rodriguez et al., 2005), which may deter firms 
from operating in a given country (North, 1990). In fact, it has been found that political 
risk jeopardizes the success of CBM&As in several ways (Moschieri et al., 2014) and 
studies confirm that political systems, with predictable rules, minimize risks (Kraus et al., 
2015). 
Political institutions have a direct impact on deal duration (Cai et al., 2015), and 
studies show that the larger the political distance the more likely a CBM&A deal not to be 
completed (Reis, 2017). This may be due to the fact that political distance increases the 
complexity of a deal (Zhang & Xu, 2017), possibly due to information asymmetry 
(Akerlof, 1970). When acquirer firms face large political distance, they may find it difficult 
to reconcile the different legitimacy requirements and institutional environment in the host 
market. (Liou & Rao-Nicholson, 2017). In fact, if political institutions are similar to those 
of the home country, it might be easier for acquirer to adapt to target country (Kostova & 
Zaheer, 1999). Therefore, firms must develop capabilities and knowledge to adapt to the 
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local institutional environment which may be a long process (Muehlfeld et al., 2012), 
increasing the time required to complete a CBM&A deal. Hence, I hypothesize the 
following: 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the political distance between acquirer and target 
countries, the longer the time to complete a CBM&A deal.  
3.2. Economic Distance 
Economic institutions determine the constraints and the incentives for economic 
activity (North, 1990). The differences in the institutions are described by economic 
distance, which are referred as the dissimilarities among countries, regarding the economic 
activity such as Income, Inflation, Exports and Imports (Berry et al., 2010). Moreover, the 
economic distance often reflects differences in factor costs and in technological capability 
between two countries (Tsang & Yip, 2007). 
When home and target countries are more economically dissimilar, firms that 
undertake a CBM&A deal must face higher costs (Reis, 2017) and they have to adapt to 
the local economic environment firms, in order to develop capabilities and knowledge, 
which can become a long and expensive process, leading to a delay in the profitability 
(Reis, 2017). On the contrary, similar economic institutions in acquirer and target 
countries, have a positive influence in the performance of a firm (Bevan et al., 2004). 
Economic distance is likely to induce risk in internationalization due to 
misunderstandings and problems in accessing foreign stakeholders (Ghemawat, 2001). So, 
if economic distance between two countries is large, the acquiring firm perceive high risk 
which could lead to deal abandonment (Lim et al., 2014). Thus, similar economic 
institutions in home and target countries decrease uncertainty and risk (Bevan et al., 2004), 
which allow for deals to be completed in a quicker way. Therefore, I hypothesize the 
following: 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the economic distance between acquirer and target 
countries, the longer the time to complete a CBM&A deal. 
3.3. Administrative Distance 
Administrative distance exists because countries have different bureaucratic, 
working and political structures, caused by colonization linkage, language, religion or 
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legal differences (Berry et al., 2010). Evidence supports the fact that CBM&As are 
more likely to occur between countries that share a common religion, a common 
language and a common origin of legal systems (Ahern et al., 2015). Existing 
commercial laws are rooted in two main origins: the common and the civil law (Porta 
et al., 1998). Differences in the legal system of home and target countries (civil law 
versus common law or vice versa) may cause acquirer firms to withdraw the CBM&A 
deal, due to the rise of the costs of doing business (Dikova et al., 2010). So, it is safe 
to say that the larger the differences between the legal and regulatory issues of target 
and acquirer countries, more challenging it would be for acquirers to overcome those 
barriers (Zhou et al., 2016). This means that efficient legal infrastructure reduces 
institutional uncertainties and reduces the transactions costs of doing business by 
facilitating the establishment and enforcement of contracts (Bevan et al., 2004).  
Different government policies are an important source of administrative distance 
(Ghemawat, 2001). In order to protect domestic companies, the government of the 
target country, may raise barriers that can cause delay in the negotiations (Malhotra et 
al., 2009). Similarly, a country’s government can be ineffective, with excessive 
regulations which lead to the necessity of spending more time and money to overcome 
the regulations (Kaufmann et al., 2007). Besides that, the level of complexity of each 
country’s fiscal rules and the differences in tax rates play an important role as 
determinants of CBM&As (Monteiro, 2012). In fact, excessive regulations lead to 
increased costs (Kaufmann et al., 2007) and consequently, affect the likelihood of deal 
success (Caiazza, & Pozzolo, 2016). Furthermore, unfamiliarity of rules and 
regulations of the target country may create substantial risk and uncertainty of 
operations (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2014). So, firms have to adapt to the administrative 
environment of the target country, what can be a long and costly process, hindering 
the negotiations. Therefore, I advance the following: 
Hypothesis 3: The greater the administrative distance between acquirer and 
target countries, the longer the time to complete a CBM&A deal. 
3.4. Cultural Distance 
Firms are embedded in a system of social and cultural norms that often affect the 
processes and outcomes of CBM&As (Shimizu et al., 2004). Cultural distance makes it 
more difficult for parties to come together, interact, and share ideas (Lane et al., 2017), 
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what could result in misunderstandings and conflicts between the two merging 
organizations (Otterspeer, 2016). When there is a cultural proximity, it is easier to 
exchange knowledge, to combine capabilities, better integrate and communicate (Ramos, 
2017). Communication may be the most important factor throughout the entire CBM&A 
process (Appelbaum et al., 2000). Even when language differences are not present, 
organization members are likely to prefer communicating with other members from similar 
cultures rather than with members from distant cultures (Lane et al., 2017). 
Acquirers and targets with larger cultural differences are more likely to have 
different business priorities and different decision-making processes, which add an extra 
degree of difficulty to the process (Gomes et al., 2013). As a result, those deals are more 
likely to face disagreement and conflict during the negotiation stage (Alexandridis et al., 
2016). In fact, empirical studies show that national culture has a significant impact on the 
internationalization decision of firms (Malhotra et al., 2009), and Kogut and Singh (1988) 
demonstrate that differences is culture between home and host countries increase the level 
of risk. Large cultural distance makes it very difficult for managers to precisely understand 
the foreign market, owing to the environmental complexity (Sousa, 2015). Additionally, 
Hutzschenreuter et al. (2014) suggest that cultural distance may delay learning and disturb 
the decision-making process.  
Cultural distance negatively affects CBM&A’s effectiveness (Ahammad et al., 2016) 
and performance (Wu, 2014), and time to completion is an important barometer of the 
success of a deal (Cai et al., 2015). If we consider that differences in values, rules, 
traditions and ways of doing business in a given country can induce risk, create 
misunderstandings and conflicts (Lincoln et al., 1981; Sousa & Bradley, 2008), we can 
expect that adaptation and resolution of those problems can take time and increase 
CBM&As time to completion. Hence, I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 4: The greater the cultural distance between acquirer and target 
countries, the longer the time to complete a CBM&A deal. 
3.5. Moderating Effect of EU Membership 
EU membership is a moderating variable (Chaudoin et al., 2016). EU membership 
constrains the policy autonomy of member states, which can change the relationship 
between the explanatory variables and the outcome variable (Chaudoin et al., 2016).  This 
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means that we may expect to see a different relationship between trade policy among EU 
members, compared to that relationship among non‐members. 
Regional integration promotes the widening of markets, and because state members 
have easier access to the larger market they are, they achieve a better position than the ones 
that do not belong to the regional integration (Benito et al., 2003). The regional integration 
schemes represent a specific subdivision of location advantages (Vernon, 1996) and MNE 
activity is more likely to take place within member countries (Benito et al., 2003). Open 
economies are known to remove unnecessary restrictions on exports and imports, thus, 
encouraging FDI flows, such as CBM&As (Jayanthi et al., 2016).  
Studies show evidence that there are substantial benefits for MNEs operating within 
the EU, compared to those operating outside it (Benito et al., 2003).  For instance, 
Moschieri et al.’s (2014) study deals with acquirers which are EU state members to see if 
the benefits of regional integration are confined to existing members, or whether they spill 
over to any acquirer regardless of EU membership. The results support that idea by 
indicating that political risk lose influence after the Takeover Directive that was issued by 
the EU Commission (Moschieri et al., 2014). Research also find out that CBM&A deals 
from companies outside the block are hampered by protective measures by the EU for non-
EU foreign investors (Aktas et al., 2007; Campa & Hernando, 2004). Besides that, 
European firms prefer European counterparts, to partners located outside of the EU to 
reduce risks (Dutcik, 2017). Protectionism is a barrier to internationalization and free trade, 
and it is usually used to protect a country’s home industry from countries that are 
competitors (Korneliussen & Blasius, 2008).  
The ongoing harmonization of Europe’s political environment has started a process 
of corporate restructuring throughout Europe (Bley & Madura, 2003). Europe has 
undergone fundamental changes in political structure following the collapse of the 
Communist bloc, formal and informal trade barriers have been removed or reduced 
because of deepening and widening regional integration (Kokko & Tingvall, 2014).  EU It 
is the result of a process of voluntary economic and political integration between the 
nation-states of Europe (Hix & Høyland, 1999).  
Adapting to target country’s political institutions may be easier for acquirers if 
political institutions are similar to those of the home country (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). 
CBM&As occur in the international business environment which means that firms have to 
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face differences between countries, political issues and other institutions may delay firms’ 
operations abroad (Ferreira et al., 2014). Above that, differences in the institutions between 
home country and target country means that firms must adapt to different political 
institutions to gain legitimacy to operate in a new country (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), what 
may take time and consequently delay the negotiations abroad.  Since there is little 
variation in terms of the levels of political institutions among EU members (Coricelli et al., 
2016), one may expect the following:  
Hypothesis 5: EU membership of both acquirer and target countries moderates 
the effect of political distance on time to complete a CBM&A deal. 
One of the purposes of the EU is to foster greater economic integration among its 
members (Alesina et al, 2017). Deep regional integration can result in an increasing 
similarity in the economic structures of the participating countries (Benito et al., 2003). In 
fact, existing studies find evidence of economic convergence in GDP per capita in the long 
run, due to the catch-up in growth of the poorer countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, 
and Eastern Europe, more recently) (Alesina et al., 2017). This makes EU an example of 
diminished economic distance (Ramos, 2017).  
EU has taken significant steps towards the integration of its member countries, such 
as the adoption of the Euro as a single currency and the implementation of the Directive for 
Takeovers in Europe (Moschieri et al., 2014). In fact, the removal of cross-border barriers 
and the adoption of a single currency led to substantial economic integration among 
European economies (Bley & Madura, 2003). The presence of a stable, well-accepted 
currency increases FDI (Grosse & Trevino, 2005) and despite great differences in per 
capita income among member states and in national attitudes toward issues like inflation, 
debt, and foreign trade, the EU has a high degree of coordination of monetary and fiscal 
policies (Cia factbook, 2018). A common currency – the euro – circulates among 19 of the 
member states that make up the European Economic and Monetary Union (Cia factbook, 
2018). The introduction of Euro in EU has two major impacts: first, creates a more liquid 
European capital market that provides companies new sources of financing and facilitating 
access to large amounts of funds (Campa & Hernando, 2004). Second, the euro signals 
member countries’ commitment to advance the political and economic agenda of the 
Union, lowering transaction costs for CBM&As, and eliminating the barriers represented 
by trading with different currencies (Moschieri & Campa, 2014), improving the efficiency 
of the market (McCarthy & Dolfsma, 2015). Institutions behind EU are meant to protect its 
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member-states more than outsiders (Moschieri et al., 2014), so it is plausible that 
companies from member countries may feel more secure about their investments in the 
EU, as opposed to firms from non-member countries. Additionally, uncertainty 
surrounding exchange rates between European countries is removed, membership in EU 
may reduce the time to completion of a CBM&A deal, thus I propose: 
Hypothesis 6: EU membership of both acquirer and target countries moderates 
the effect of economic distance on time to complete a CBM&A deal. 
Administrative distance refers to differences in bureaucratic patterns due to colonial 
ties, language, religion, and the legal system (Berry et al., 2010). Industry regulation, the 
efficiency of the financial markets and the legal framework for corporate decisions can 
affect the completion of corporate investments (Moschieri & Campa, 2014). To avoid 
monopoly created by mergers, antitrust and competition laws were created to address the 
competition concerns and ensure enough rivalry (Cai et al., 2015). Besides that, recent 
evidence shows that the more an CBM&A transaction threatens to harm rival European 
firms through increased competition, the greater the likelihood of European regulatory 
intervention, especially when the acquirer is foreign (Aktas et al., 2007). In fact, due to 
economic nationalism, regulatory agencies in host countries have incentives to block 
transactions to protect resources to be transferred to the foreign acquirer (Cai et al., 2015).  
Increasing integration in the EU is reducing the administrative distance between 
member states (Angué & Mayrhofer, 2009). In EU, common legislation and coordination 
occurs through the structure of supra-regional institutions, which results in a convergence 
of issues such as tax rates, quality of infrastructure, competition law, incentive schemes, 
corporate governance, procurement regulations, etc. (Eliassen & Monsen, 2001). The 
“Takeover Directive” intention is to create favorable conditions for the rise of an European 
market for corporate control (Moschieri et al.,2014). The aim of this new regulatory 
framework is to harmonize different national takeover laws through consistent takeover 
rules across the EU (Moschieri & Campa, 2014). Key provisions in such a harmonization 
process, considered efficient takeover mechanisms, a common regulatory framework and 
the strengthening of shareholder rights (European-Commission, 2007). In fact, EU has a 
unique supranational law system in which, according to the Treaty of Lisbon, the law 
adopted by the Union, based on the Treaties, have primacy over the law of Member States 
(CIA Factbook, 2018). Hence, EU presents a similar administrative measure among its 
member states. This means that state members are accustomed to laws and regulations 
36 
 
within EU, and outsider firms need to adapt and cope the differences, so it is expected that 
EU membership moderates the effect of administrative distance on CBM&As time to 
completion. Thus, I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 7: EU membership of both acquirer and target countries moderates 
the effect of administrative distance on time to complete a CBM&A deal. 
Cultural distance provides a static index of the potential problems that firms involved 
in CBM&As may face (Smith, 2015). The main negative effects of cultural distance are the 
clashes or conflicts that may arise due to differences in the perceptions and attitudes of the 
firm’s managers (Vasilaki, 2011).  It becomes more difficult to come together, interact and 
share ideas (Reus & Lamont, 2009), which can reduce firms effectiveness (Bae & 
Salomon, 2010). Additionally, countries that are similar to each other in terms of culture 
can be expected to have facilitated trade agreements (Kokko & Tingvall, 2014). 
The effects of cultural distance between countries are especially relevant to Europe 
(Aylward, 2016). The aim of European collaboration has been to integrate national markets 
into one large European market and reduce all internal barriers to trade. Each European 
country has specific cultural values (Aureli & Demartini, 2010), but the continuing process 
of globalization in Europe may have reduced cultural differences between them (Kokko & 
Tingvall, 2014). Barriers such as physical and administrative borders, as well as a common 
currency for some state members, no longer exist and EU state members should be nearly 
completely integrated into one market (Frieden & Eichengreen, 2018). Free movement of 
people within EU is one of the most fundamental freedoms and a necessary precondition 
for building a single market (Vandenbrande et al., 2006). Mobility confers the right for EU 
nationals to move to another Member State freely, to take up employment and to establish 
themselves in the host country, with their family members (www.europa.eu). As 
individuals move, they join new ingroups (Triandis, 1989), allowing interaction and 
integration into new cultures. This interaction leads to a reduction of cultural distances in 
the EU. Thus, it is expected that EU membership moderates the effect of cultural distances 
in CBM&As time to completion. Hence, I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 8: EU membership of both acquirer and target countries moderates 
the effect of cultural distance on time to complete a CBM&A deal. 
The greater the similarity between two countries’ institutional systems and 
structures, the more likely an investor will recognize and take advantage of opportunities 
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existing across national borders (Alhorr et al., 2008). Thus, the inexistence of trade barriers 
in EU should stimulate CBM&As and reduce their time to completion. The hypotheses 
mentioned above are schematically represented in the figure below. 
Figure 2 - Conceptual model 
 
Source: Author 
4. Method  
In this chapter, I describe the sample, the measurement of the variables and the 
approach that I use to understand the effect of institutional distances on CBM&As time to 
completion, and the moderating effect that EU membership has in this relation. I start by 
describing the sample, then I present the variables that were used and, finally, I describe 
the statistical procedures that I used to test the model. 
4.1. Data and Sample 
The empirical data for this study was collected from five distinct sources. Country 
level data regarding institutional differences was retrieved from two sources: Berry et al. 
(2010) for political, economic and administrative distance, and Hofstede’s website (2010) 
for the cultural dimension. Additional country-level data was collected from 
https://europa.eu website (EU membership) and inflation rate was retrieved from World 
Development Indicators. The firm-level data and deal-level data was obtained through 
Thomson Reuters’ Securities Data Corporation Platinum (SDC Platinum), which is one of 
the leading databases for financial transactions (Reis, 2017). 
Previous research used these sources (Dikova et al., 2010; Ferreira, et al., 2017; Reis 
2017). SDC Platinum has been extensively used in academic research on M&As (Caiazza 
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& Pozzolo, 2016; Dikova et al., 2010; Ferreira et al., 2017; Malhotra et al., 2009; 
Monteiro, 2012; Zhang et al., 2011; Zhou et al., 2016). Likewise, institutional distance data 
from Berry et al. (2010) has been widely used by international business scholars (Ferreira 
et al., 2017; Reis, 2017; Wu, 2014; Zhou & Guillén, 2015). Similarly, CD index (Kogut & 
Singh, 1988) using Hofstede’s (1980) scores has been broadly used in international 
business research (Ferreira et al., 2017; Malhotra et al., 2009; Quer et al., 2012; Zhang & 
Xu, 2017), and has been identified as one of the major sources for failing in CBM&A deals 
(Kummer, 2007). Despite the criticism on Hofstede’s measures of cultural distance 
(Shenkar, 2001), it continues to be largely used in studies, including in M&A (Stahl & 
Voigt, 2008). This index is considered to be the best measure of national cultural distance 
available, because Hofstede’s scores are accessible for a vast amount of countries and 
many researchers have confirmed their validity (Otterspeer, 2016). 
The sample collection procedures involved several steps. SDC Platinum was used to 
get an exhaustive list of mergers and acquisitions that took place during the year of 2011. 
The original data comprehended 37,441 deals, in which I further impose several selection 
criteria in order to collect valid data to test my hypothesis. First, I was only interested in 
deals whose target firm was EU state member. Hence, I eliminated all deals that did not 
fulfill this condition. Second, because I wanted to measure time to completion of a 
CBM&A deal, I deleted all deals that did not present the status as “completed”. Third, and 
because my intention was to assess the impact of institutional distance between countries, I 
excluded all deals that occurred within the same country. Then, using OECD (2000), I 
excluded all countries that were considered tax havens (See table 5A in Appendix). These 
countries are low-tax jurisdictions that provide investors opportunities for tax avoidance 
(Desai et al., 2006). Finally, I excluded the deals with insufficient data in the variables of 
interest. With this selection principles, my final sample includes 2,110 acquisitions, within 
the 27 state members of EU, in 2011 (see table 6A in appendix) and 60 acquirer countries 
(see table 7A in appendix).  
Table 2 presents the top countries involved in the deals. 51.1% of the deals occurred 
between EU state member countries and 49.9% happened with acquirer countries that were 
not members. The top five acquiring countries in CBM&As are United States (532, 
representing 25.2% of the sample), followed by United Kingdom (194, 9.2%), France and 
Germany (153, 7.3%) and Switzerland (110, 1.3%). The countries which have received 
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more operations were United Kingdom (472, representative of 22.4% of the sample), 
Germany (357, 16.9%), France (206, 9.8%), Sweden (149, 7.1%) and Spain (137, 6.5%). 
Table 2 - Top country deals 
Acquirer Country Freq. % Target Country Freq. % 
United States 532 25.2 United Kingdom 472 22.4 
United Kingdom 194 9.2 Germany 357 16.9 
France 153 7.3 France 206 9.8 
Germany 153 7.3 Sweden 149 7.1 
Switzerland 110 5.2 Spain 137 6.5 
Source: Author 
4.2. Variables 
I present my dependent, independent, moderating and control variables as follows. 
4.2.1. Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is CBM&As time to completion. This variable is measured in 
days, calculated as the difference between the formal announcement date and its 
completion. (Cai et al., 2015; Dikova et al., 2010; Ferreira et al., 2017; Reis, 2017). The 
dates were taken from SDC Platinum. 
The completion date is an indicator that both parties involved perceive most crucial 
issues for the acquisition were resolved (Dikova et al. 2010). The time interval between a 
CBM&A announcement and completion (completion time) will be influenced by several 
factors (Ekelund et al., 2001), and deals which are profitable for both parties involved tend 
to be closed quickly, suggesting that if too much time passes after the announcement, the 
likelihood of a deal being completed decreases (Butler & Sauska, 2014; Caiazza & 
Pozzolo, 2016).  
4.2.2. Independent Variables 
The independent variables in this study are the different dimensions of institutional 
distance presented by Berry et al. (2010) regarding Political, Economic and Administrative 
issues and Hofstede’s (1980) work for Cultural distance. The data consists on the distance, 
for each institutional dimension, between the acquirer and target country. 
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Political distance. Political distance reflects aspects such as policy-making 
uncertainty; democratic character and size of the state; world trade organization 
membership and regional trade agreement (Berry et al., 2010).   Meaning that it considers 
the influence that the government of each country has on the economy, property rights, 
democratic level, political stability, and participation in trade bloc agreements (Berry et al., 
2010). In fact, governments influence, and sometimes dominate transactions within an 
economy through laws, regulations, and institutions (Rodriguez et al., 2005). This measure 
has been used previously by Buckley et al. (2007), Duanmu, (2012) and Duanmu and 
Guney, (2009). Political distance was calculated through Mahalanobis distance from Berry 
et al. (2010). This method is the best choice when measuring distances between pairs of 
countries, because it is scale invariant and takes into consideration the variance–covariance 
matrix in computation (Berry et al., 2010). 
Economic distance. Economic distance regards differences on stability and economic 
development and considers factors such as income (GDP per capita), inflation (GDP 
deflator), exports and imports (Berry et al., 2010).  This means that it represents the 
differences in income level and distribution, consumer habits of consumption, level of 
inequality, consumer wealth and the cost and quality of natural, financial and human 
resources. The wealth of a nation or consumer income is the most economically important 
attribute in the distance between countries with a significant effect on levels of trade and 
the types of partners each country achieves (Ghemawat, 2001). In fact, the examination of 
these indicators is correlated with purchasing power and consumer preferences, economic 
stability, and the openness of the economy to external influences (Berry et al., 2010). 
These factors influence the selection of entry mode into international markets, the study of 
a firm’s performance and survival (Caves, 1996). For this variable I have used Berry’s et 
al. (2010) Mahalanobis distance. 
Administrative distance. Administrative distance comprehends the regulative 
differences between target and acquirer country in aspects such as colonizer-colonizes 
linkage, common language and religion and legal system (Berry et al., 2010). If companies 
have the same set of laws, rules and mechanisms, they are able to predict the behavior of 
their partners, increasing the mutual trust (Favre, 2014). On the contrary, when they do not 
share the same laws, rules and mechanisms, these differences cause insecurity and 
relational risks. So, we can say that the higher the administrative distance, the less the 
companies will be able to predict their partners’ behavior, the higher the insecurity and 
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relational risks will be (Favre, 2014). This variable was measured with Berry et al. (2010) 
Mahalanobis distance. 
Cultural distance. Cultural distance is the degree of difference between the cultural 
norms of the acquirer nation and the target country in question (Kogut & Singh, 1988). 
People of different cultures will encounter similar problems but view them from different 
angles (Reus & Lamont, 2009), that is why is closely linked to information asymmetry that 
exists between the negotiating parties of a deal (Wu, 2014). I measured cultural distance, 
using Kogut and Singh’s (1988) formula, combining Hofstede’s (2010) four most common 
cultural dimensions – individualism, uncertainty avoidance, power distance and 
masculinity, as follows: 
ܥݑ݈ݐݑݎ݈ܽ ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁ = ෍{(ܪ஺௝ସ
௝ୀଵ
 − ܪ்௝)ଶ/ ௝ܸ}/4 
Where H A,j is the acquiring country for Hofstede’s cultural dimension j. H T,j 
represents the target country score for the corresponding cultural dimension j and V j is the 
variance of the index score of cultural dimension j.  
Power distance corresponds to the acceptance and expectation of difference of power 
and inequalities inside a population. The individualism versus the collectivism is whether a 
society is looking for each other and expects help from other members of the community 
or not. The masculinity versus femininity is looking at whether the society is competition 
and achievement oriented or cooperation and consensus-oriented. The uncertainty 
avoidance is linked to the risk tolerance and the discomfort the risk brings. The values 
correspondent to each country, were obtained through Hofstede website. 
4.2.3. Moderating Variable 
EU membership. EU membership is a dummy variable that assumes the value one if 
both acquirer and target firms are from EU state members (see table 6A in appendix) and 
zero otherwise. EU membership data was obtained through https://europa.eu. The greater 
the similarity between two countries’ institutional structure and systems, the more likely an 
investor will be aware of the opportunities existing across national borders (Alhorr et al., 
2008). Thus, the lowering of trade barriers through the adoption of a common European 
market, would stimulate cross-border flows, and reduce risk-related barriers (Alhorr et al., 
2008). In addition to that, EU membership constrains policy autonomy of member states, 
42 
 
which can change the relationship between the explanatory variables and the outcome 
variable (Chaudoin et al., 2016). 
4.2.4. Control Variables 
I included several control variables that may be linked to CBM&As time to 
completion. 
Inflation. Inflation rate of the target’s country has been identified as one of the 
determinants of CBM&As (Uddin & Boateng, 2011). This variable is a sign for stability of 
an economy (Kummer, 2007). A more stable situation should encourage FDI, while a high 
inflation rate may reflect macroeconomic instability in the target country and therefore 
deter FDI flows (Duanmu & Guney, 2009). This means that volatile and unpredictable 
inflation rates in a target country discourages investments by creating uncertainty (Buckley 
et al., 2007), what turns to be particularly challenging for foreign investors (Meyer, 2001). 
Furthermore, an instable inflation rate is a sign for the government's inability to maintain 
consistent monetary policy (Grosse et al., 2005). Thus, acquiring companies face increased 
risk due to uncertainty and potential costs, which may lead to a longer decision time 
regarding the investment and consequently increase the time needed to complete the deal. 
The inflation rate in the target country, uses data from the World Development Indicators, 
and it has been used in several previous studies. (Alhorr et al., 2008; Uddin & Boateng, 
2011). 
Previous experience in EU deals. Higher experience, manifested through previous 
M&As, gives the possibility to obtain more and specific knowledge about different 
markets and related factors (Ramos, 2017). These skills and knowledge can be transferred 
from one acquisition to another (Shimizu et al., 2004; Zhang et al., 2011). Consequently, 
internationally experienced acquirers are more likely to be aware of CBM&As pitfalls and 
are more capable at resolving related conflicts. (Dikova & Sahib, 2013). Therefore, 
experience should help attenuate the distance factor, as it would be easier and more 
efficient to overcome problems and differences (Ramos, 2017), and is expected that this 
facilitates deal completion (Cai et al., 2015). In fact, experience with acquisitions decreases 
the time duration from announcement to completion (Ferreira et al., 2017). However, if 
prior acquisitions are significantly different from the current acquisition, the gained 
knowledge may not be applicable to a specific situation (Shimizu et al., 2004). The idea 
that a firm can use its prior experience in the same country is in line with the concept of 
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'experiential' knowledge (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) and therefore success in merging and 
acquiring a firm in the same country will be more likely (Favre, 2014) So, one can say that 
local experience is a more direct measure of relevant experience (Ferreira et al., 2017). 
Therefore, I have considered EU as the “local” previous experience, which assumed the 
value of one if the acquirer was involved in as EU CBM&A deal in the previous five years, 
and zero otherwise. This information was obtained through SDC Platinum. 
Relatedness. Non-related acquisitions tend to be more complex and involve greater 
uncertainty and difficulty (Ferreira et al., 2017). When target and acquirer operate in the 
same industry, the level of perceived risk would be minor, because both firms share the 
same level of knowledge and understanding of the industry (Lim et al., 2014). So, it is 
expected a reduction on information asymmetries (Aguilera et al., 2008; Luypaert & De 
Maeseneire, 2015;), and firms may be able to more easily negotiate (Ngo & Susnjara, 
2016). I compared the four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes from 
acquirer and target firms, creating a dummy variable, which assumed the value of one if 
the 4-digit SIC codes match and zero otherwise (Aguilera & Dencker, 2008; Ahammad et 
al., 2015; Ferreira et al., 2017; Hernández & Nieto, 2015; Lubatkin et al., 1993; Zhang et 
al., 2011; Zhou et al., 2016). The SIC codes were obtained in SDC Platinum. 
Acquirer advisors. Considering the complexity and diversity of problems regarding 
the entry in a foreign market, firms often seek help from advisors in the country where the 
target firm is located (Shimizu et al., 2004). Hiring an adviser has the objective of reducing 
the effect of institutional distance on CBM&A time to completion (Reis, 2017) and assist 
the firm in achieving a better performance (Hayward, 2002). Legal, financial and strategic 
advisors are commonly used, and there is a high global concentration of advisors across 
Europe (Campa & Moschieri, 2008). An acquirer advisor, by reducing the risk involved in 
a CBM&A deal, may reduce the negotiation’s period. Using information from SDC 
Platinum, I have considered the intervention of acquirer advisors by using a dummy 
variable which takes the value of one if an acquirer hires an advisor and zero otherwise. 
(Reis, 2017; Zhang, et al., 2011). 
Bidders. Competing bids are less likely to be completed (Campa & Moschieri, 2008). 
The degree of competition may have implications for target and acquirer bargaining 
behaviors when there is more than one bidder (Deminova, 2014). Multiple bidders may 
also signal an impending bidding war, causing some bidders to end negotiations early (Ngo 
& Susnjara, 2016). If there is more than one bidder, it becomes less probable that the target 
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will quickly reach an agreement with one (Luypaert & De Maeseneire, 2015), and complex 
deal structures such as are competing bids, might increase deal duration (Cai et al, 2015). 
Hence, following previous studies (Aguilera, & Dencker, 2008; Ngo & Susnjara, 2016) a 
dummy variable, reported by SDC Platinum, was assigned to measure the existence of 
multiple bidders, through the number one if there were multiple bidders, and zero 
otherwise. 
Tender Offer. A tender offer is the purchase of a significant package of shares that 
provides effective control of the target, from a single or a group of investors. (Campa & 
Moschieri, 2008). A deal being carried out by means of a tender offer, is posited to 
influence CBM&As (Reis, 2017; Alexandridis et al., 2016) and might increase deal 
duration. (Cai et al, 2015). Thus, with data from SDC Platinum, I have used a dummy 
variable with the value of one for tender offers, and zero otherwise.  
The summary of the variables is presented in the following table. 
Table 3 - Summary of the variables 
Variable name Measurement Source 
CBM&As Time 
to Completion 
Number of days between the announcement 
and the end of the deal. SDC Platinum 
Political 
Distance 
Differences in the nature of political 
systems, namely in: policy-making 
uncertainty, democratic character, size of the 
state, world trade agreements and regional 
trade agreement. Computed with 
Mahalanobis distance. 
Berry et al. (2010) 
Economic 
Distance 
Differences in Income, Inflation, Exports 
and Imports. Computed with Mahalanobis 
distance. 
Berry et al. (2010) 
Administrative 
Distance 
Difference in bureaucratic patterns, 
influenced by: colonizer-colonized link, 
common language, common religion, legal 
system. Computed with Mahalanobis 
distance. 
Berry et al. (2010) 
Cultural 
Distance 
Difference in cultural values and norms 
calculated using the Kogut and Singh (1988) 
Euclidean distance, based on the four 
cultural dimensions of Hofstede (1980).  
http://geert-hofstede.com 
EU 
Membership 
Dummy variable with a value of 1 if both 
target and acquirer countries are EU state 
members, and 0 otherwise. 
https://europa.eu 
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Inflation  Value of Inflation rate of the target country in 2011. 
World Development 
Indicators from 
https://data.worldbank.org 
Previous 
experience in 
EU deals 
Measure of acquirer's previous experience in 
undertaking CBM&A EU. Dummy variable 
with a value of 1 if acquirer was involved in 
EU CBM&A deals in the previous 5 years, 
and 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
Relatedness 
The acquirer’s business is related to the 
target’s business, based on matching 4-digit 
SIC codes for the acquirer and target firm. 
Dummy variable with a value of 1 if the 
target and acquirer belong in the same 
industry, and 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
Acquirer 
Advisors 
Existence of advisors in the CBM&A deal. 
Dummy variable with a value of 1 if the 
acquirer hires advisors, and 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
Bidders 
Existence of multiple bidders in the 
CBM&A deal. Dummy variable with the 
value of 1 for existence of multiple bidders, 
and 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
Tender Offer Dummy variable with a value of 1 for tender offers, and 0 otherwise.  SDC Platinum 
Source: Author 
4.3. Procedures 
Using a sample of 2,110 deals that occurred during 2011 in EU, I test in which 
manner the institutional distance factors effect CBM&As time to completion, by estimating 
a linear regression model. CBM&As time to completion can be estimated by either Linear 
Regression (OLS) or Poisson regression: Luypaert and De Maeseneire (2015) estimated 
both models, and the results of a Poisson count regression were similar to the linear 
regression model. Thus, for the simplicity of interpretation, I used a linear regression 
model. 
Regression is a statistical model that is used to predict the behavior of a variable 
(Pestana & Gageiro, 2005), in this case, the time elapsed between announcement and 
completion of a CBM&A deal. This statistical model is composed of a set of statistical 
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techniques used to model relationships between variables and to predict the value of one or 
more dependent variables from a set of independent variables (Maroco, 2003). This model 
allows us to evaluate the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable, 
being used to measure: the existence of the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables; the strength of the relation between variables, realizing the amount 
of variation of the dependent variable that is explained by the independent variable; the 
form of this relationship; and a prediction of values of the dependent variable (Malhotra & 
Birks, 2007). 
The dependent variable time is continuous, measured in days, elapsed between the 
announcement of the acquisition and its completion, and it did not present operations 
classified as pending. Regression model has the advantage that coefficients are easier to 
interpret. (Dikova et al., 2010; Reis, 2017) and is the best linear unbiased estimator (Favre, 
2014).  
The empirical analysis is formalized as follows: 
CBM&A time to completion = β0 + β1 political distance + β2 Economic distance 
+β3 Administrative distance + β4 Cultural distance + β5 political distance*EU membership 
+ β6 Economic distance*EU membership +β7 Administrative distance*EU membership + 
β8 Cultural distance*EU membership + ∑β9-15 Controls + ε 
The application of the multiple linear regression model presupposes the verification 
of some assumptions, namely the absence of autocorrelation in the errors or residues, the 
absence of multicollinearity, the normality of the residues and the homoscedasticity.  
Starting the global evaluation of the linear regression model, I tested the hypothesis 
of multicollinearity, which would indicate if the independent variables would be strongly 
correlated (Maroco, 2003). I analyzed multicollinearity between the variables through two 
methodologies: Pearson correlation coefficient and the VIF (See table 4 - Descriptive 
statistics and correlations).  Pearson correlation coefficient determines the strength of the 
linear relationships between the dependent variable and the independent variables, varying 
from -1 to 1, indicating respectively a perfect negative or positive association between the 
variables (Pestana & Gageiro, 2005). The closer the Pearson's correlation coefficient R is 
to -1 or 1, the better the quality of the model and the stronger the relationship between the 
variables under analysis. Pearson’s correlations are not especially high, except between 
Political distance (PD) and EU membership.  
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VIF also examines the level of multicollinearity in the regression, by quantifying the 
estimated regression coefficient resulting from collinear between variables. In this study, 
the VIF, is ranged between 1.017 and 2.135, which are well below the suggested threshold 
by Belsley et al. (1980), revealing there is no multicollinearity problems.  
To test the autocorrelation between the residues, I used the Durbin-Watson. 
Whenever the value belongs to the region of acceptance [1.36; 2.64], the autocorrelation 
between the residues is null (Pestana & Gageiro, 2005). In this study the values in all the 
model’s tests are within the regions of acceptance, which means that there is no 
autocorrelation between the residues. 
5. Results  
This chapter refers to the presentation of the results of the empirical study. In this 
study I used a linear regression model, in which its assumptions were analyzed and 
verified. All the VIF values are ranged between 1.017 and 2.135, which are well below the 
suggested threshold by Belsley et al. (1980). Thus, no multicollinearity issues were evident 
in my sample. 
5.1. Results 
The descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) and correlations of the 
variables that I have used in this research are presented on Table 4. 
  
48 
 
Table 4 - Descriptive statistics and correlations 
    N Mean S.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 VIF 
1 Time to completion 2,110 19.580 46.080 1.000             
2 Inflation 2,110 3.150 0.978 0.034 1.000           1.031 
3 
Previous 
Experience in 
EU deals 
2,110 0.431 0.495 0.013 -0.034 1.000          1.038 
4 Relatedness 2,110 0.518 0.500 -0.016  0.032 -0.058** 1.000         1.021 
5 Acquirer Advisors 2,110 0.252 0.614 0.292
** 0.013 0.039 -0.060** 1.000        1.092 
6 Bidders 2,110 1.001 0.031 0.072** 0.029 -0.027 -0.032 0.238** 1.000       1.108 
7 Tender Offer 2,110 0.017 0.130 0.209** 0.022 0.026 -0.019 0.190** 0.234** 1.000      1.093 
8 Political Distance 2,110 1534.041 1255.809 0.074
** 0.138** -0.067** 0.015 0.026 -0.010 -0.018 1.000     2.111 
9 Economic Distance 2,110 4.778 7.638 0.050
* 0.045* -0.068** -0.043* 0.008 0.021 0.088** -0.048* 1.000    1.065 
10 Administrative Distance 2,110 15.029 20.752 0.038 -0.020 0.023 -0.027 0.026 -0.016 -0.023 0.015 -0.008 1.000   1.017 
11 Cultural Distance  2,110 1.928 2.186 0.073
** 0.084** -0.058** -0.097** 0.043* 0.051* 0.070** 0.030 0.167** 0.036 1.000  1.054 
12 EU membership 2,110 0.500 0.500 -0.067** -0.106** 0.147** 0.002 0.016 0.000 0.029 -0.711** -0.066** 0.069** -0.022 1.000 2.135 
**. The correlation is significant at 0.01 (2-tailed) 
*. The correlation is significant at 0.05 (2-tailed) 
Source: Author 
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The results indicate that the time gap from announcement to completion, amounts to 
19.580 days on average which is quite different to the mean number of days reported by 
Ekelund et al. (2001), 94 days, or by Dikova et al. (2010), 96 days, the 107 days by Campa 
and Moschieri (2008) or even the 112 reported by Luypaert and De Maeseneire (2015). 
However, the results were similar to ones obtained by Reis (2016), which were 24.6 days.   
Acquirer Advisors, Bidders, Tender Offer, Political Distance, Economic Distance 
and Cultural Distance have a positive and significant relationship with the dependent 
variable (p-value < 0.01 and p-value < 0.05 for economic distance). In turn, EU 
Membership have a negative and significant relationship with the CBM&As time to 
completion variable (p-value < 0.01). Pearson’s correlations are not especially high, except 
between Political distance (PD) and EU membership (-0.710). In this study, the VIF is 
ranged between 1.017 and 2.129, which are well below the suggested threshold by Belsley, 
Kuh and Welsch (1980), revealing there is no multicollinearity problems.  
The relatedness variable was split in half, meaning that 51.8% of the firms operate in 
the same industry. Similarly, 50% of the deal occurred between EU state members. At 
average, 1.001 were the number of bidders in a CBM&A deal. 
A basic measure to evaluate the significance of the model is the analysis of the 
determination coefficient, or R2. R2 measures how much of the variation of Y is explained 
by the model and varies between 0 and 1. A value closer to 1 means a model with higher 
quality (Pestana & Gageiro, 2005). Observing the adjustment of the models (See table 5 -
Results of the regression analysis) one can see that Model 10 (R2 = 0.118) is slightly better 
than the baseline model (R2 = 0.109). Low explanatory power usually happens for large 
panel datasets (Dikova et al., 2010). However, my focus is on the contribution of my 
theoretical hypothesis, rather than on explaining as much as possible the variation of 
CBM&A time to completion. 
Another way of evaluating the quality of the model is through the F test of the 
ANOVA table. The ANOVA table analyzes the existence of significant differences 
between the mean of the various samples of a variable and verifies if the variance 
explained by the model is significantly greater than the error of the model. The F test 
validates the model overall and not each of the parameters alone (Pestana & Gageiro, 
2005). Considering the values obtained, for a significance level of 5%, the F test has a p-
50 
 
value of less than 0.05 (Sig. = 0.000), so it is safe to conclude that the global model is 
statistically significant. (see table 5 – Results of the regression analysis). 
The results of the linear regression models testing my hypotheses are presented on 
Table 5. Model 1 includes only the control variables. In the subsequent four models, I 
introduced the institutional distance dimensions: model 2 represents political distance 
between acquirer and target countries of the firms involved in the CBM&A deals; model 3 
considers economic distance and model 4 regards administrative distance and model 5 
studies the impact of cultural distance. The moderating effects were tested in Models 6 to 
9, one at a time. On Model 10 I performed a joint test of the distance variables (See table 
5). 
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Table 5 - Results of the regression analysis 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
(Constant) 55.298 50.556 54.250 53.095 55.431 57.069 58.993 54.023 58.982 51.110 
 (32.465) (32.422) (32.459) (32.476) (32.428) (32.651) (32.365) (32.407) (32.368) (32.641) 
Inflation 1.302 0.873 1.235 1.331 1.107 0.857 1.058 1.105 0.849 0.988 
 (0.970) (0.977) (0.970) (0.970) (0.972) (0.976) (0.975) (0.974) (0.982) (0.993) Previous Experience in 
EU deals -0.180 0.210 0.044 -0.244 0.111 0.713 1.033 0.867 1.097 1.125 
 (1.920) (1.919) (1.924) (1.919) (1.922) (1.939) (1.936) (1.932) (1.936) (1.941) 
Relatedness 0.118 0.071 0.265 0.196 0.579 0.163 0.487 0.514 0.700 0.968 
 (1.903) (1.899) (1.905) (1.903) (1.911) (1.900) (1.899) (1.899) (1.906) (1.909) 
Acquirer Advisors 20.053** 19.871** 20.076** 19.965** 19.974** 20.021** 20.162** 20.047** 20.009** 19.958** 
 (1.608) (1.606) (1.608) (1.608) (1.607) (1.608) (1.602) (1.602) (1.602) (1.605) 
Bidders -45.807 -43.884 -45.681 -44.860 -47.693 -45.158 -48.487 -44.304 -48.039 -46.958 
 (32.370) (32.303) (32.357) (32.360) (32.342) (32.299) (32.266) (32.237) (32.254) (32.258) 
Tender Offer 58.753** 59.271** 57.675** 59.077** 57.721** 59.458** 59.188** 59.575** 58.754** 58.721** 
 (7.603) (7.588) (7.629) (7.602) (7.607) (7.590) (7.612) (7.578) (7.598) (7.638) 
Political Distance  0.002**    0.001    0.001 
  (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001) 
Economic Distance   0.203    0.472*   0.354 
   (0.125)    (0.185)   (0.201) 
Administrative Distance    0.078    0.234**  0.206* 
    (0.046)    (0.085)  (0.086) 
Cultural Distance      1.058*    1.338* 0.835 
     (0.439)    (0.565) (0.606) 
EU membership      -5.699 -4.205 -4.239 -5.529* -0.112 
52 
 
      (4.024) (2.275) (2.418) (2.581) (4.737) 
Political Distance*EU      0.000    0.000 
      (0.002)    (0.002) 
Economic Distance*EU       -0.534*   -0.389 
       (0.250)   (0.263) Administrative 
Distance*EU        -0.204*  -0.181 
        (0.101)  (0.102) 
Cultural Distance*EU         -0.719 -0.249 
         (0.887) (0.914) 
           N  2,110 2,110 2,110 2,110 2,110 2,110 2,110 2,110 2,110 2,110 
F-value  43.847** 39.228** 37.990** 38.030** 38.500** 30.942** 31.663** 31.821** 31.634** 19.728** 
Model R2  0.111 0.116 0.112 0.112 0.114 0.117 0.119 0.120 0.119 0.124 
Adjusted R2 0.109 0.113 0.109 0.109 0.111 0.113 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.118 
**. Significant at the 0,01 level (2-tailed) 
*. Significant at the 0,05 level (2-tailed) 
Dependent variable: Time to completion 
Std. error in parentheses.  
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Model 1 includes only the control variables. Number of Acquirer Advisors (20.053; 
p-value <0.01) and Tender Offer (58.753; p-value <0.01) are statistically significant. In 
Model 2, I entered the political distance variable which allow us to test hypothesis 1 (H1). 
This variable is statistically significant (p-value <0.01), with a positive coefficient of 
0.002. This result suggests that political distance increases time to completion of a 
CBM&A, thus confirming H1. Model 3 considers economic distance. The results are not 
statistically significant, which means that hypothesis 2 (H2) is not confirmed. In model 4, I 
considered administrative distance. Similar as in the previous model, the relationship is not 
significant, thus, not confirming hypothesis 3 (H3). Model 5 studies the impact of cultural 
distance on time to completion of CBM&As, which presents a statistically significant (p-
value <0.05), positive coefficient of 1,058, consistent with hypothesis 4 (H4). This result 
suggests that the greater the cultural distance between acquirer and target country, the 
greater the time to completion of a CBM&A deal.  
The hypothesized moderating effects of EU membership were tested in Models 6 to 
9, one at a time. Model 6 considers the moderating effect of EU membership in the 
influence of political distance on CBM&A time to completion. The results are not 
statistically significant, hence, not confirming hypothesis 5 (H5). Model 7 reflects the 
effect of economic distance and EU membership as a moderator. This model is statistically 
significant (p-value <0.05) and it has a negative coefficient of -0.534. This result confirms 
hypotheses 6 (H6), which states that the economic distance effect on CBM&A time to 
completion is moderated by EU membership of both target and acquirer country. Model 8 
includes administrative distance and the effect of the moderating variable EU membership. 
This result has a statistically significant result (p-value <0.05) with a negative coefficient 
of -0.204. This seem to suggest that administrative distance effect is also moderated by EU 
membership, confirming hypotheses 7 (H7). In model 9 I have tested the effect of cultural 
distance, together with the moderating variable EU membership. The result does not 
present statistical significance. Thus, not confirming hypotheses 8 (H8). On model 10, I 
performed a joint test of the Institutional distance variables and the moderating effect of 
EU membership.  
Table 6 presents a summary of the hypotheses tested, presenting both the expected 
relationship and the empirical conclusion. 
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Table 6 - Results of the hypotheses testing CBM&As time to completion 
Hypotheses Relationship Conclusion 
H1 
The greater the political distance between acquirer and target 
countries, the longer the time to complete a CBM&A deal.  
Positive and 
significant Supported 
H2 
The greater the economic distance between acquirer and 
target countries, the longer the time to complete a CBM&A 
deal. 
Not significant No Effect 
H3 
The greater the administrative distance between acquirer and 
target countries, the longer the time to complete a CBM&A 
deal. 
Not significant No Effect 
H4 
The greater the cultural distance between acquirer and target 
countries, the longer the time to complete a CBM&A deal. 
Positive and 
significant Supported 
H5 
EU membership of both acquirer and target countries 
moderates the effect of political distance on time to complete 
a CBM&A deal. 
Not significant No Effect 
H6 
EU membership of both acquirer and target countries 
moderates the effect of economic distance on time to 
complete a CBM&A deal. 
Negative and 
significant Supported 
H7 
EU membership of both acquirer and target countries 
moderates the effect of administrative distance on time to 
complete a CBM&A deal. 
Negative and 
significant Supported 
H8 
EU membership of both acquirer and target countries 
moderates the effect of cultural distance on time to complete 
a CBM&A deal. 
Not significant No Effect 
Source: Author 
5.2. Robustness tests 
To strengthen the findings, I conducted some robustness tests. Some studies use 
Berry’s cultural distance dimension (Ferreira et al., 2017). To make my study comparable 
and in line with these study, by examining cultural differences in cross-border acquisitions, 
I re-estimated the model with cultural distance based on Berry’s cultural dimension (see 
table 7). With this new cultural measure, the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
Table 7 - Robustness test – Alternative measurement of Cultural distance 
 Variable Model 1 Model 2 
(Constant) 53.495 57.145 
 (32.564) (32.532) 
Inflation 1.459 1.200 
 (0.984) (1.001) 
Previous Experience in EU deals -0.191 0.721 
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 (1.936) (1.951) 
Relatedness -0.313 -0.215 
 (1.920) (1.916) 
Acquirer Advisors 19.959** 19.993** 
 (1.615) (1.611) 
Bidders -46.268 -46.200 
 (32.439) (32.352) 
Tender Offer 58.738* 59.324** 
 (7.737) (7.728) 
Cultural Distance Berry 0.180 0.181 
 (0.095) (0.108) 
EU membership  -4.160 
  (3.285) 
Cultural Distance Berry*EU  -0.242 
  (0.239) 
   N  2,110 2,110 
F-value  37.565** 30.833** 
Model R2  0.113 0.118 
Adjusted R2 0.110 0.114 
** - Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* - Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Dependent variable: Time to completion 
Std. error in parentheses.  
I also conducted a robustness test on the experience variable (Dikova et al., 2010). 
The measure of experience used only considers deals that took place in EU, so, it narrows 
the location of the experience variable. Thus, I conducted an additional test using the 
previous experience gained globally, not only in a specific location such as EU. The results 
for the institutional variables remained unchanged (see table 8). 
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Table 8 - Robustness test - Experience 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
(Constant) 49.778 46.624 48.592 47.521 49.888 53.254 54.636 49.778 54.822 46.892 
 
(32.471) (32.422) (32.462) (32.484) (32.430) (32.675) (32.394) (32.438) (32.396) (32.663) 
Inflation 1.331 0.911 1.256 1.361 1.125 0.890 1.083 1.135 0.868 1.016 
 
(0.969) (0.976) (0.969) (0.968) (0.971) (0.976) (0.974) (0.973) (0.982) (0.992) 
Previous Experience 
Total 
3.671 3.222 3.908* 3.662 3.947* 3.264 3.679 3.473 3.639 3.787* 
 (1.913) (1.914) (1.916) (1.912) (1.913) (1.914) (1.913) (1.908) (1.911) (1.917) 
Relatedness 0.261 0.180 0.416 0.343 0.738 0.246 0.573 0.596 0.784 1.069 
 (1.900) (1.896) (1.901) (1.900) (1.907) (1.897) (1.896) (1.895) (1.902) (1.905) 
Acquirer Advisors 19.900** 19.755** 19.923** 19.810** 19.815** 19.918** 20.047** 19.935** 19.894** 19.847** 
 
(1.607) (1.605) (1.607) (1.608) (1.606) (1.607) (1.602) (1.602) (1.602) (1.605) 
Bidders -42.551 -41.356 -42.384 -41.570 -44.506 -42.928 -46.096 -41.919 -45.741 -44.630 
 
(32.354) (32.291) (32.338) (32.345) (32.322) (32.291) (32.253) (32.228) (32.242) (32.243) 
Tender Offer 58.409** 58.985** 57.242** 58.725** 57.335** 59.219** 58.877** 59.319** 58.478** 58.380** 
 
(7.596) (7.583) (7.621) (7.595) (7.598) (7.585) (7.606) (7.572) (7.592) (7.632) 
Political Distance  
0.002* 
  
0.001 0.001 
  
(0.001) 
   
(0.001) (0.001) 
Economic Distance   
0.221 
  
0.491* 
  
0.369 
   
(0.125) 
   
(0.185) 
 
(0.201) 
Administrative 
Distance    
0.077 
  
0.238* 0.209* 
    
(0.046) 
  
(0.085) (0.086) 
Cultural Distance      
1.108* 
  
1.369* 0.850 
     
(0.438) 
   
(0.565) (0.605) 
EU membership      
-5.554 -3.836 -3.892 -5.217* 0.180 
      
(4.012) (2.262) (2.407) (2.564) (4.727) 
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Political Distance*EU      
0.000 
   
0.000 
      
(0.002) 
   
(0.002) 
Economic 
Distance*EU       
-0.544* 
  
-0.397 
       
(0.250) 
  
(0.263) 
Administrative 
Distance*EU        
-0.209* 
 
-0.185 
        
(0.101) 
 
(0.102) 
Cultural Distance*EU         
-0.716 -0.224 
         
(0.886) (0.913) 
           N  2,110 2,110 2,110 2,110 2,110 2,110 2,110 2,110 2,110 2,110 
F-value  44.536** 39.684** 38.660** 38.617** 39.185** 31.290** 32.094** 32.214** 32.051** 19.999** 
Model R2  0.113 0.117 0.114 0.114 0.115 0.118 0.121 0.121 0.121 0.125 
Adjusted R2 0.110 0.114 0.111 0.111 0.112 0.114 0.117 0.118 0.117 0.119 
** - Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* - Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Dependent variable: Time to completion 
Std. error in parentheses.  
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The results corroborate the findings in my model: H1, H4, H6 and H7 are still 
statistically significant (p-value < 0.05), that is: as the political and cultural distances 
between the home and target country increases, higher it will be the time to complete a 
CBM&A deal and that EU membership, for both acquirer and target country, moderate the 
effect of economic and administrative distance effect on CBM&As time to completion.  
To measure the robustness of the linear model prediction time to completion I used a 
Tobit estimation. This technique is the most appropriate for cases of left or right censoring 
(Ferreira et al., 2017), and in this case, the dependent variable is left censored at 0. Though 
I do not present the results here, they remained identical. The robustness tests did not 
reveal relevant changes in the coefficients results.  
6. Discussion 
In this Master dissertation I intend to analyze the impact of Institutional Distance on 
CBM&As time to completion. This subject is not yet completely understood, despite the 
latest interest of scholars (Dikova et al., 2010; Ferreira et al., 2017; Reis, 2017). I 
developed a model that hypothesizes the negative effect of political, economic, 
administrative and cultural distances on CBM&A time to completion. Nevertheless, I 
assume that membership, of both target and acquirer countries, in EU, weakens that effect, 
since this is a free trade area, an economic union, with the possibility of a political union 
formation (Feng & Genna, 2003) and has advantages for member states, as a whole 
(Barrell & Pain, 1999). 
I test my model by using a sample of completed deals which occurred in EU during 
the year of 2011. To the best of my knowledge, this is the only study that considers 
institutional distance effect on time to completion of CBM&A deals within EU context. I 
have tested four distance dimensions: political, economic and administrative distance, 
developed by Berry et al., (2010); and cultural distance provided by Hofstede (2010), 
suggesting that more distance would lead to a higher temporal hiatus between the 
announcement and completion of a CBM&A deal.  
The coefficients of the results came as expected, but only two of my hypotheses 
concerning the effect of institutional distance on CBM&As time to completion were 
empirically supported: Political and Cultural distance. In H1 I argue that the greater the 
political distance, more time will be required to complete a CBM&A deal. In fact, previous 
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studies indicate that institutional difference and, precisely, political distance, are positively 
significant when related to CBM&As performance (Sun, n.d.; Wu, 2014). Thus, a similar 
outcome could be expected when considering time to completion as a measure for 
performance. CBM&As time to completion is an important barometer of the success and 
efficiency of a deal. (Cai et al., 2015) and is considered as a measure of a firm’s 
performance (Shimizu et al., 2004). Besides that, Jimenez et al. (2014) argued that some 
firms might use a capability of dealing with political risk to negotiate better, and 
consequently, faster conditions of entry. These capabilities would reduce institutional 
distance and therefore diminish the time hiatus of negotiation.   
Cultural distance also presented a significant and positive outcome. This result 
suggests that the higher the cultural distance, longer it will be the time required to complete 
a CBM&A deal. Previous studies presented diverse findings. Ferreira et al. (2017), on a 
Brazilian study context, have found a significant negative effect of the cultural differences 
between target and acquirer countries on time to completion of a CBM&A deal. This 
means that the temporal hiatus decreases for firms originating from more culturally distant 
countries. This result can be justified by the fact that companies might be aware of cultural 
differences and have prepared themselves better for the deal. In turn, Sun (n.d.), advocates 
that cultural distance between the acquirer and target firm, in CBM&A performance, is 
positively significant in a Chinese sample, but negatively significant in Taiwan. 
Nevertheless, Otterspeer’s (2016) results indicate that CBM&As performances are lower 
when countries are more culturally distant. So, firm performance is significantly affected 
by large cultural distance (Wu, 2014), which can increase the negotiation period.  
The effect of economic and administrative distance on CBM&As time to completion 
did not present statistical significance, meaning that the hypotheses were not supported. 
The results obtained by Reis (2017) concerning the effect of administrative distance are 
divergent from his proposition: The author hypothesized that the greater the administrative 
distance between home and host country, the greater the period from announcement to 
decision of the CBM&A deal. However, the results indicate that administrative distance 
leads to a quicker decision, meaning, that greater the administrative distance, less time will 
be necessary to conclude a CBM&A deal. This reveals that further investigation is needed. 
Economic distance, also, did not confirm to have any effect on CBM&As time to 
completion. This dimension has not received as much attention from scholars as the other 
institutional distances, maybe because it is not identified as a key factor in institutional 
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economies (Bae & Salomon, 2010). However, Reis (2017) also did not provide support for 
the effect of economic distance on time to decision of a CBM&A deal.  
I proposed a moderating negative effect of EU membership on the impact of 
institutional distances on CBM&A time to completion. The results for my hypothesis 
regarding the moderating effect of EU membership on the impact of Political distance on 
CBM&As time to completion were not significant, thus not confirmed. Europe has 
undergone fundamental changes in political structure following the collapse of the 
Communist bloc, trade barriers have been reduced or removed because of deepening and 
widening regional integration (Kokko & Tingvall, 2014), however, despite the intention to 
create a political union in the EU, this has not yet been materialized, this means that 
political differences are still present in Europe (Campa & Moschieri, 2008). In fact, signs 
of the differences in the political orientation of the principal EU members have been 
frequent (Vernon, 1996), so, one should not expect that a political convergence happens in 
a quick manner.  
Economic distance effect on CBM&As time to completion seems to be moderated by 
EU membership. The results present a significant and negative coefficient, which means 
that EU membership seems to moderate the effect of economic distance on time to 
completion. EU has been through an economic convergence process (Alesina et al., 2017) 
which removed unnecessary restrictions (Jayanthi et al., 2016) and consequently, 
decreasing costs of making corporate acquisitions across this trade block. (Moschieri & 
Campa, 2014). In addition to the abolition of cross-border barriers, the adoption of a single 
currency has led to substantial economic integration (Bley & Madura, 2003), that 
eliminated problems associated to trading with different currencies, (Moschieri & Campa, 
2014). This allowed to remove uncertainty surrounding exchange rates between EU 
countries, resulting on a more intense cross-border competition (Bley & Madura, 2003). 
Hence, despite great differences in per capita income among member states and in national 
attitudes toward issues like inflation, debt, and foreign trade, EU achieved a high degree of 
economic convergence (CIA Factbook) which is reflected by the moderating effect of EU 
membership on the impact of economic distance on CBM&As time to completion. 
EU membership, for both target and acquirer countries, seems to have a moderating 
effect on the impact of Administrative distance on CBM&As time to completion. The 
results have been found to have a significant negative effect, thus, supporting my 
hypothesis. This result can be explained by the increasing integration in the EU that is 
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reducing the administrative distance between member states (Ramos, 2017). This means 
that trade blocs, can have an additional positive effect on trade with other countries, by 
providing more homogeneous rules and regulations of trade with each member country of 
the trade bloc (Korneliussen & Blasius, 2008).  In fact, harmonization of institutions and 
policies was a goal of the process of European integration (Alesina et al., 2017) which are 
expressed in a set of treaties, that must be agreed and ratified (become part of the law of 
the member state). Regarding M&A deals, recent evidence shows that the more a 
transaction threatens to harm rival European firms through increased competition, the 
greater the likelihood of European regulatory intervention, especially when the acquirer is 
foreign (Aktas et al., 2007). Hence, we can assume that EU law protects its state members, 
thus the administrative distance aspects, regarding the negotiation process of a CBM&A 
deal, are reduced.  
The moderating effect of EU membership on the impact of cultural distance on time 
to completion of a CBM&A deal was not statistically significant. Therefore, my hypothesis 
was not confirmed. The explanation for this result might be linked with the fact that within 
Europe, various cultural clusters can be distinguished (Hofstede, 1991) so, Europeans are 
too different from each other in terms of culture and they have not become culturally more 
similar during the last three decades (Alesina et al., 2017).  In fact, the illusion of a 
homogeneous culture in EU countries may be misleading and confusing in business 
activities (Kaasa, et al., 2016). If we think that cultural distance comprehends the social 
and human norms, language and education differences between countries (Ghemawat, 
2001), EU does not have that type of convergence. In each EU country, the individuals 
react differently to certain behaviors and attitudes towards authority, trust, family and work 
(Berry et al., 2010), meaning that individual countries in this common market area still 
differ widely in cultural values and believes, so it is not surprising that the expected 
moderating effect was not verified. 
7. Conclusion 
This study investigates whether the CBM&A time to completion is influenced by 
institutional distances, and if this effect is moderated by EU membership, for both target 
and acquirer countries. This study examines 2,110 deals involving target firms located in 
EU during the period of 2011, and a linear regression model is used to examine the 
relationship between CBM&A time to completion and institutional distances (political, 
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economic, administrative and cultural). My empirical setting was, to the best of my 
knowledge, innovative in CBM&A research: by focusing on EU CBM&As, I analyze the 
influence of institutions in the main block of the world, which allows to build theory that is 
context-specific to regional economic block.  
This study has theorized and indicates that not all distance dimensions have a 
negative effect on CBM&A time to completion: the results suggest that political and 
cultural distance are positively related to CBM&As time to completion, meaning that 
greater the distance between the countries, more time it will be required to complete the 
deal. Above that, results suggest that EU membership moderate the effect of economic and 
administrative distance, by reducing the time hiatus between announcement and 
completion of a CBM&A deal.  
European authorities are skeptic about the existence of a homogeneous European 
M&A market (Moschieri & Campa, 2014). European authorities have long claimed that the 
existence of different national systems of takeover regulation, the retention of costly 
structural and technical barriers to takeovers, and the legal, normative, and political 
differences in the framing of economic policy are still hindering progress towards a 
European active M&A market (European-Commission, 2005, 2007). 
7.1. Contributions 
Research on time to completion of CBM&A is in the early stage, only a handful of 
institutional studies have looked at this subject (Cai et al., 2015; Dikova et al., 2010; 
Ferreira et al., 2017; Reis, 2017;). So, they do not provide a complete comprehensive 
understanding of acquisition completion. Hence, this dissertation enriches the research 
agenda of international business and helps to fill the gap through investigating institutions 
and CBM&A time to completion. First, the findings help reinforce previously documented 
evidence that institutional differences influence deal time to completion. It helps to 
understand some factors that lead to longer negotiations, which in turn, increase the costs 
of doing business abroad (management costs, negotiation costs, costs with auditing and 
loss of managerial focus from other activities (Ferreira et al., 2017). It is possible to cut 
these costs by reducing the time hiatus between CBM&A time to completion. 
Second, I make a novel contribution to the existing literature on the topic, by 
documenting evidence of the moderating effect of EU membership on the relationship 
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between institutional differences and time to completion of a CBM&A deal. Institutional 
distance has been connected to location choice, entry mode strategy, and performance.  By 
focusing on EU, I hold constant the influence of target country institutions which allows us 
to build theory that are context-specific. Thus, EU member state firms can, on a sustained 
basis, choose a deal over another, based on the location, in or out of the EU. 
7.2. Managerial implications 
This study has important managerial implications. Carrying out a CBM&A deal in an 
institutionally distant country has benefits, but also risks and costs that must be considered. 
In fact, firms face inherent costs when doing business abroad arising from the unfamiliarity 
of the environment, from cultural, political, and economic differences (Zaheer, 1995). 
Thus, understanding institutional distances between countries is crucial. It is only through 
the awareness of these differences that companies can, on the one hand, choose the 
business that is most favorable to them and, on the other, prepare themselves properly in 
order to reduce risks and costs associated to long negotiation. In essence, this means that a 
firm needs to observe and understand the impact of the external institutional environment 
on their business operations in order to prevent future costs related to the length of the pre-
acquisition phase. 
 Managers arguably recognize the importance of geographic and cultural distances 
(Reis, 2017). However, my study focuses on other institutional distances (political, 
economic and administrative) that may have impact on a CBM&A deal. Hence, my 
findings allow managers to be aware that other institutional contexts carry hurdles that 
should be considered. Similarly, this study points to important clues that can be followed 
by managers whose firms are located in EU or intend to expand to this market.  Despite EU 
being an open market there are still institutional distances that should be considered in 
order to extract the desired benefits from the CBM&A deal. Briefly, understanding the 
effect of institutional distances on CBM&A time to completion will provide managers a 
framework to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency when performing such a deal. 
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7.3. Limitations and suggestions for future 
research 
This study is subject to several limitations, which presents some opportunities for 
future research.  First, it is worth noting that this study is limited to a specific region. 
Clearly, EU represents a unique group of countries in terms of size and proximity to one 
another. Therefore, the same results may not be realized when applied to other countries, 
regions or trading block. Thus, future research could consider other locations, or economic 
blocks. 
Second, this study relies upon one moment in time, and neither the number or 
characteristics of the deal, nor other variables (country or firm level related), should be 
extrapolated to other periods of time. So, future research could consider other periods of 
time to investigate this issue and eventually, confront the results with the ones obtained 
through this dissertation. 
Third, this study does not differentiate CBM&A by the industry firms operate. Certain 
industries may be more sensitive to some of the institutional distances than another. 
Ghemawat (2001) suggests that electricity, for instance, is highly sensitive to 
administrative and geographic factors but not at all to cultural factors. Scholars such as 
Dikova et al. (2010) studied business service industry; Ferreira et al., (2017) considered 
CBM&As of high technology firms in their research and Reis (2017) considered firms in 
non-financial industries. Thus, future research could distinguish the industry in which the 
firms operate and study the different effects of institutional distances. 
Fourth, I only studied some of institutional distances, provided by Berry et al. (2010) 
and Hofstede (2010). And, when a phenomenon is analyzed, it has been shown that the 
different dimensions of institutional distance have different effects on it (Pogrebnyakov & 
Maitland, 2011). Hence, other institutional distance variables could be used in the future to 
investigate their effect on CBM&A time to completion.  
Fifth, my sample did not allow to differentiate deals by its size, and CBM&A deal 
size can be influenced by institutional distance (Wu, 2014). Legislators may pay more 
attention to a particular CBM&A deal when it involves large amounts of money, causing 
delay in negotiations. However, the dataset in this study did not provide complete 
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information on this matter, so it was not possible to provide this insight. Future studies, 
with use of more specific data, could allow to investigate this matter. 
Sixth, my sample did not consider the motives for the deal. There are several 
explanations for why CBM&As occur, and understanding these motives is key for 
understanding deal success or failure (Calipha et al., 2010). Whether to get into different 
geographic locations, to access new markets, to grow and gain market power (Ramos, 
2017), to secure resources, increase global outreach (Kummer, 2007), access strategic 
assets or improve firm’s efficiency (Wu, 2014), the motive that lead a firm to pursue a 
CBM&A deal might have impact on time do completion of a deal, hence it should be 
interesting to analyze.  
Finally, CBM&As time to completion’s study is yet in an embryonic stage, so there 
are additional interactions that would be noteworthy to investigate in the future: hostile 
takeover attempt could affect deal time to completion; mergers are a type of business 
transaction where governments have both the opportunity and the motive to exert 
considerable influence (Cai et al., 2015) and consequently their impact on time to 
completion deserves further research.  
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9. Appendices 
Table 1A - Value of CBM&As, 2005 - 2011 (Millions of dollars) 
 
Source: UNCTAD, 2012 
 
Table 2A – Berry et al. (2010) Dimensions of Institutional Distance and Component 
Variables 
Distance Definitions Component variables 
Political distance (PD) 
Differences in political stability, 
democracy and trade bloc 
membership 
Democracy score 
Regional trade agreement 
Membership in WTO 
Democracy score 
Economic distance 
(ED) 
Differences in economic 
development and macroeconomic 
characteristics 
GDP per capita 
Exchange rate 
Export (%GDP) 
Import (%GDP) 
Financial distance (FD) Differences in financial sector development 
Private sector (%GDP) 
Stock market size/value (%GDP) 
Number of listed companies 
Knowledge distance 
(KD) 
Differences in patents and scientific 
production 
Number of patents per 1 million 
population 
Number of scientific articles per 1 
million population 
Global-connectedness 
distance (GCD) 
Differences in tourism and internet 
use 
International tourism expenditure 
(%GDP) 
International tourism receipts 
(%GDP) 
Internet users per 1000 people 
Demographic distance 
(DD) 
Differences in demographic 
characteristics 
Life expectancy at birth (years) 
Birth rate 
Population under 14 (%) 
Population above 65 (%) 
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Administrative distance 
(AD) 
Differences in colonial ties, 
language, religion and legal system 
Colonizer-colonized link 
Common language (%Population) 
Common religion (%Population) 
Legal system 
Cultural distance (CD) 
Differences in attitudes towards 
authority, trust and individuality, and 
importance of work and family 
Hofstede’s 4 cultural dimensions: 
Power distance 
Uncertainty avoidance 
Individualism 
Masculinity 
Geographic distance 
(GD) 
Great circle distance between 
geographic center of countries Great circle distance 
Source: Berry et al. (2010) 
 
Table 3A - EU Institutions 
EU Institutions 
European Parliament 
European Council 
Council of the European Union 
European Commission 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
European Central Bank (ECB) 
European Court of Auditors (ECA) 
European External Action Service (EEAS) 
European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) 
European Committee of the Regions (CoR) 
European Investment Bank (EIB) 
European Ombudsman 
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) 
Interinstitutional bodies 
Source: Author, based in Europa.eu 
 
Table 4A - Cultural dimensions in Europe 
Cultural dimension Description Analysis in Europe 
Power Distance (PDI) 
This dimension expresses the degree to 
which the less powerful members of a 
society accept and expect that power is 
distributed unequally. The fundamental 
issue here is how a society handles 
inequalities among people. 
There is a lot of variation in 
the EU in this dimension, but 
only a minority of cultures 
have a very low PDI score. 
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Individualism vs. 
Collectivism (IDV) 
The high side of this dimension, called 
individualism, can be defined as a 
preference for a loosely-knit social 
framework in which individuals are 
expected to take care of only themselves 
and their immediate families. Its opposite, 
collectivism, represents a preference for a 
tightly-knit framework in society in which 
individuals can expect their relatives or 
members of a particular in-group to look 
after them in exchange for unquestioning 
loyalty. 
There is a lot of variation in 
the EU in this dimension, but 
the vast majority of cultures 
lean toward individualism. 
Masculinity vs. 
Femininity (MAS) 
The Masculinity side of this dimension 
represents a preference in society for 
achievement, heroism, assertiveness and 
material rewards for success. Society at 
large is more competitive. Its opposite, 
femininity, stands for a preference for 
cooperation, modesty, caring for the weak 
and quality of life. Society at large is 
more consensus-oriented. 
There is an extreme degree of 
variation in the EU in this 
dimension. We have some of 
the world's highest and the 
world's lowest MAS scores, 
with scores in between 
basically lining up in a very 
linear way. Very diverse. 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
(UAI) 
The Uncertainty Avoidance dimension 
expresses the degree to which the 
members of a society feel uncomfortable 
with uncertainty and ambiguity. The 
fundamental issue here is how a society 
deals with the fact that the future can 
never be known: should we try to control 
the future or just let it happen? Countries 
exhibiting strong UAI maintain rigid 
codes of belief and behavior and are 
intolerant of unorthodox behavior and 
ideas. Weak UAI societies maintain a 
more relaxed attitude in which practice 
counts more than principles. 
The cultures in the EU clearly 
feel uncomfortable with 
uncertainty and ambiguity. 
Ireland, the UK, Sweden, and 
Denmark form a clear 
minority in this regard. 
Long Term Orientation 
vs. Short Term 
Normative Orientation 
(LTO) 
Every society has to maintain some links 
with its own past while dealing with the 
challenges of the present and the future. 
Societies prioritize these two existential 
goals differently. Societies who score low 
on this dimension, for example, prefer to 
maintain time-honoured traditions and 
norms while viewing societal change with 
suspicion. Those with a culture which 
scores high, on the other hand, take a 
more pragmatic approach: they encourage 
thrift and efforts in modern education as a 
way to prepare for the future. 
There is clearly a lot of 
variation among cultures in 
the EU here, but the majority 
lean toward long term 
orientation and not short term 
normative orientation. 
Source: Author based in Hofstede (2010) 
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Table 5A - List of countries classified as tax havens 
OECD, 2000 
Andorra  Maldives 
 Anguilla  Marshall Islands 
 Antigua and Barbuda  Monaco 
 Aruba  Montserrat 
 Bahamas  Nauru 
 Bahrain  Netherlands Antilles 
 Barbados  Niue 
 Belize  Panama 
 British Virgin Islands  Samoa 
 Cook Islands  Seychelles 
 Dominica  Saint Lucia 
 Gibraltar  St. Christopher & Nevis 
 Grenada  St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
 Guernsey/Sark/Alderney  Tonga 
 Isle of Man  Turks & Caicos 
 Jersey  US Virgin Islands 
 Liberia  Vanuatu 
Liechtenstein  
Source: Author based on OECD (2000). 
 
Table 6A - EU state members in 2011 
EU State member 
Austria Germany Netherlands 
Belgium Greece Poland 
Bulgaria Hungary Portugal 
Cyprus Ireland Romania 
Czech Republic Italy Slovakia 
Denmark Latvia Slovenia 
Estonia Lithuania Spain 
Finland Luxembourg Sweden 
France Malta United Kingdom 
Source: https://europa.eu 
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Table 7A - Acquirer countries 
Acquirer Countries 
Argentina Croatia Greece Kuwait New 
Zealand 
Saudi Arabia Thailand 
Australia Cyprus Hungary Latvia Norway Singapore Turkey 
Austria Czech 
Republic 
Iceland Lebanon Oman Slovakia Ukraine 
Belgium Denmark India Lithuania Peru Slovenia United 
Kingdom 
Bolivia Egypt Ireland Luxembourg Philippines South Africa United 
States 
Bosnia Estonia Israel Malaysia Poland South Korea United 
Arab 
Emir. 
Brazil Finland Italy Malta Portugal Spain  
Canada France Japan Mexico Qatar Sweden  
China Germany Kazakhstan Netherlands Russia  Switzerland 
Source: Author 
 
